Legacies of Conflict: Self-efficacy and the Formation of Conditional Trust*

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Abstract

Exposure to armed conflict in early life is a traumatic experience, affecting 400 million children worldwide. We combine theory, measurement and evidence to study how psychological legacies of conflict mediate the relationship between exposure to conflict and the long-term formation of trust preferences. We do so in a sample of 3900 women born during the Sierra Leonean civil war and surveyed 14 years later. We first develop a framework describing the link between exposure to conflict and trust. This makes precise what individuals have in mind when expressing conditional trust in others, and establishes the role of self-efficacy in linking conflict and trust. Our empirical analysis shows that exposure to conflict significantly increases self-efficacy, and through this channel, conflict leads conditional trust to rise and for outright trust of others to fall, relative to those never exposed to conflict. To microfound how exposure to conflict translates into psychological legacies, we construct a granular typology of experiences of conflict, combining information on age of exposure to conflict and recall of victimization. We use this to show how direct exposure, memories and trauma, and narratives of conflict from others each distinctively shape self-efficacy. Finally, we show how our model can help reconcile heterogeneous findings across conflict scenarios, and suggest avenues for future work on the more general role of psychological legacies from traumatic shocks early in life on the long-term formation of economic preferences. *JEL: N9, O1*.

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1 Introduction

History is shaped by armed conflict. Since 1989, 123 countries have experienced such violence, resulting in 14 million deaths. The scourge of conflict is especially acute in Africa, where 39 out of 54 countries have experienced conflict since 1989 [UCDP 2018].

Conflict adversely affects the accumulation of human and physical capital, leading to underdevelopment traps [Collier *et al.* 2003]. At the individual level, psychological legacies of conflict can also impact economic decision making. Whether such legacies help or hinder post-conflict recovery is an unresolved issue. A body of work in economics and political science has highlighted that exposure to conflict tends to foster pro-social behavior [Bauer *et al.* 2016, Hartman and Morse 2020], while others have argued that exposure to conflict can strengthen parochial altruism, whereby ingroup cooperation is reinforced at the expense of weaker across-group cooperation [Henrich and Boyd 2001, Bowles 2008], and that recurring conflict can be explained by violence sowing seeds of distrust [Collier *et al.* 2003, Rohner *et al.* 2013a, 2013b].

We combine theory, measurement, and evidence to shed light on the link between conflict and trust. This is a first order issue in post-conflict societies because trust underpins anonymized market transactions and cooperation in non-market exchange such as risk sharing. Ultimately, it forms the foundation for interactions and acts as 'an important lubricant of the social system' [Arrow 1974]. We first develop a framework describing the link between conflict exposure and trust. This makes precise what individuals have in mind when expressing conditional trust in others, and establishes the role of psychological legacies of conflict – operating through the generation of self-efficacy – in linking conflict and trust. We show such links exist empirically, are quantitatively important, and these channels complement established mediators of conflict on trust operating through beliefs over the trustworthiness of others.

Our context is Sierra Leone. Our analysis is based on a sample of 3900 young girls and women surveyed in 2014, all born during the civil war that took place between 1991 and 2001. This was one of the most brutal conflicts experienced by a civilian population in recent times. As has been extensively documented, the violence largely did not operate along ethnic, religious or political lines [Conibere *et al.* 2004, Humphreys and Weinstein 2006, Bellows and Miguel 2009]. Instead, the conflict is best characterized by indiscriminate episodes of violence and abuse of civilians from all armed sides. As a result, the decade long conflict spread to nearly all Chiefdoms in Sierra Leone, with the majority of households potentially exposed to violence.

We measure generalized trust using a question with similar wording to the World Values Survey (WVS): "*In general do you think people can be trusted, or that they cannot be trusted?*" However, in contrast to the WVS, we allow respondents to answer yes, no, or it depends (and allow for don't know or refusals). 11% of respondents say 'no' (outright distrust of others), 37% say 'yes', and 51% say 'it depends'. This highlights the prevalence of *conditional trust* among those born into the civil war, expressed more than a decade after the conflict. This response does not reflect

respondent uncertainty: none answered the trust question with 'don't know' or refused to answer.[1]

We develop a parsimonious framework to link conflict exposure and trust preferences, making precise what women might have in mind when expressing conditional trust in others. There are of course many reasons why trust in others might be conditional. A natural way to classify explanations is that trust is conditioned on either: (i) fixed characteristics of the partner, such as whether they belong to an ingroup or outgroup, that provide a signal of their trustworthiness; (ii) malleable characteristics of the partner – such as whether they are perceived to be open to behaving more cooperatively through persuasion or negotiation. The literature has largely focused on the first channel, and we complement this by considering the second. We do so in the field, building on work from laboratory settings that shows pre-play communication among anonymous partners can enhance subsequent cooperation [Charness and Dufwenberg 2006, Ederer and Schneider 2022].

To incorporate conditional trust, we assume an individual can undertake costly actions to increase the probability of their partner cooperating. We use the term 'self-efficacy' to describe an individual's belief in their ability to increase the cooperativeness of others. We borrow the term from psychology, where self-efficacy is a wider concept describing one's perceived ability to execute actions to reach a goal [Bandura 1977]. Although narrower than the original construct, in our context, self-efficacy captures beliefs about the ability to increase the cooperativeness of others: through persuasion, bargaining, negotiation, grit and determination, for example.

The model generates a solution whereby individuals choose to trust, not trust, or conditionally trust their partner depending on parameter values. The intuition is that when an individual's prior belief over the trustworthiness of the partner is neither too high nor too low, and the individual has sufficiently high levels of self-efficacy to change the cooperativeness of others, they prefer to conditionally trust the partner rather than distrust them or trust them outright. The framework makes precise that conditional trust depends on factors: (i) emphasized in the literature linking conflict and trust, such as beliefs over others, the gains from cooperation and risk aversion; (ii) emphasized more in the psychology literature captured through the notion of self-efficacy.[2]

We derive comparative statics on how greater self-efficacy changes the likelihood of conditional trust, and has asymmetric effects on the likelihood of outright trust and outright distrust of others.

[1] In the WVS the wording of the (non-incentivized) trust question is, '*Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?*' Permitted answers are, '*most people can be trusted*', '*need to be very careful*', '*don't know*', '*no answer*', or '*other missing*'. We fully recognize that there are other surveys in which a trust question is asked more subtly. For example, in the *General Social Survey* subjects are asked to indicate on a 4-point scale to what extent they agree or disagree with the following statements: (a) in general, one can trust people; (b) these days you cannot rely on anybody else; and (c) when dealing with strangers it is better to be careful before you trust them. The answer categories are labeled: strongly agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, and strongly disagree. Finally, the SEOP survey records agreement with the following statement on a 1-7 scale: "People can generally be trusted".

[2] By making precise what respondents have in mind when expressing conditional trust, our work relates to the long-standing debate around the standard World Values Survey measure of generalized trust, in that it captures beliefs over the trustworthiness of others rather than trust in others [Glaeser *et al.* 2000, Sapienza *et al.* 2013]. Our framework makes clear how the two relate and richens up the set of determining factors for generalized trust – beyond just preferences (risk aversion, inequality aversion, altruism).

The framework provides a guide for how exposure to conflict can impact trust preferences via self-efficacy. We take these ideas to data using novel measures of exposure to conflict, and build on existing work to capture multiple dimensions of self-efficacy.

To measure individual exposure to conflict we use information from migration journals to construct respondent's entire life history of Chiefdoms of residence, from their place of birth through to their current Chiefdom of residence. In terms of birthplaces, our respondents are drawn from 96 (out of 149) Chiefdoms. We then geo-reference information from migration journals to geo-coded conflict data from the *Uppsala Conflict Data Program* that records conflict events by Chiefdom-year. This allows us to construct: (i) on the extensive margin, whether the individual was ever in the vicinity of conflict (so in the same Chiefdom-year as a conflict event); (ii) on the intensive margin, the cumulative exposure to conflict at any given age. We validate this approach using first-person accounts of direct exposure to violence during the civil war, so following the approach of much of the existing literature described in Table A1.

We measure self-efficacy using a 21-question scale elicited at baseline. We consider both an aggregate measure, and five dimensions of self-efficacy related to the perceived ability to undertake costly actions to increase the cooperativeness of others: (i) locus of control; (ii) drive, grit and leadership; (iii) enforcement and persuasion; (iv) entrepreneurial skills; (v) future planning.

Our empirical results are sequenced as follows.

We first examine the link between exposure to conflict and trust preferences, using our geo-coded measure of ever being in the vicinity of conflict. Those exposed to conflict early in life are significantly more likely to report conditional trust ('it depends') rather than outright trust or distrust in others, as measured 14 years later. The marginal effect of ever being exposed to conflict is to increase conditional trust by 7.6pp, corresponding to a 15% increase over the level of conditional trust among those never exposed to conflict. This increase in conditional trust arises because of significant reductions in those reporting outright trust of others (which falls by 5.8pp).

We present a battery of checks to establish this result is replicated when using alternative econometric models, methods of covariate selection, accounting for enumerator effects, accounting for individuals being affected by conflict in neighboring Chiefdoms, and using a more localized geo-coded measure of exposure to conflict. We show the results do not reflect indecisiveness more generally among those exposed to conflict, and nor do they reflect those exposed to conflict having smaller social networks and so being more uncertain of the trustworthiness of others. To underpin a causal interpretation of the finding, we: (i) use placebo checks to strengthen the case that actual exposure to violence matters, not geographic factors correlated with conflict including pre-war confounders, or experiences of internal migration or displacement *per se*; (ii) use an IV approach, predicting exposure to conflict by exploiting interactions between geographic and temporal features related to the conflict spread.

The second stage of our analysis uses the framework to understand what psychological legacy of conflict drives this link. We establish that exposure to conflict positively correlates to our index

of self-efficacy, measured 14 years later. The magnitude of the difference is an effect size on self-efficacy of $.063\sigma$. The dimensions of self-efficacy that are most significantly impacted by exposure to conflict are future planning ($p = .003$), and drive, grit and leadership ($p = .004$).

We then re-examine the link between exposure to conflict and trust, additionally controlling for self-efficacy. We find that conditional on being exposed to conflict, self-efficacy correlates to trust preferences. A one standard deviation increase in self-efficacy is associated with a significantly higher likelihood of reporting conditional trust: the magnitude of the effect is 5.3pp, and significant at the 1% level. Higher perceived self-efficacy is asymmetrically associated with the extremes of trust preferences: we reject equality of shifts from yes/no towards conditional trust ($p = .000$). This asymmetry matches the comparative static predictions of the framework.

When all dimensions of self-efficacy are controlled for, the partial correlations between exposure to conflict and trust preferences become weaker than when we only control for exposure to conflict. Self-efficacy mediates a share of the effect of exposure to conflict on trust preferences.

What is left unanswered is *how* violent conflict translates into building self-efficacy. At a final stage of analysis we make inroads on this issue by exploiting the richness of our data to construct a granular typology of experiences of conflict, combining information on: (i) the geo-coded measure of exposure to conflict; (ii) whether an individual reports being victimized during the civil war; (iii) ages at which the individual was exposed to geo-coded conflict. Age of exposure is critical because memory formation begins largely at age three onwards, shaping later life beliefs [Fehr *et al.* 2008, Malmendier and Nagel 2011, Bauer *et al.* 2014, Malmendier 2021].

The constructed typology distinguishes five mutually exclusive experiences: (i) those socialized, because they were never in vicinity of conflict from age 3, yet they recall being victimized – their memories/recall stem from second-hand narratives passed onto them rather than direct experience; (ii) those exposed to a 'background narrative' of the war because they were never in the vicinity of conflict and nor do they recall any victimization; (iii) those with direct first-hand experience of conflict because they were in vicinity of conflict from age 3 and recall being victimized; (iv) those who are traumatized or suppressing memories of conflict because they were in the vicinity of conflict from age 3 but they do not recall any form of victimization or are unwilling to talk about it, including fighting in their area; (v) respondents similar to those with a background narrative except they were exposed to violent events early in life, yet narratives of these events have not been passed onto them by their parents/guardians, perhaps because these caregivers are either protective or are themselves traumatized.

We document that experiences of conflict matter significantly for measured self-efficacy more than a decade later. Relative to those socialized, those with parental protection/trauma or direct experience of conflict exhibit the highest levels of self-efficacy, followed by those with the background narrative and those with trauma. Pairwise comparisons of these experiences highlight the roles of memory and narratives in understanding the link between conflict and trust. For example, those with direct experience of conflict have significantly higher self-efficacy than those trauma-

tized ($p = .084$). Both sets of respondents are subject to violence after age 3 when memories are being formed, but for those with trauma, memories are suppressed.

We discuss the robustness of our results to measurement error in the construction of experiences, and to using more information on the exact type of victimization to refine the assignment of individuals to experiences. Throughout we continue to find evidence that distinct experiences of conflict have significantly different associations with self-efficacy measured 14 years later.

We conclude by discussing the external validity of our findings, using our framework and results to describe the forces shaping how mediators of conflict and trust differ across scenarios, depending on experiences of conflict and the exact forms of victimization suffered.

Our work provides two core contributions. First, we develop a framework linking conflict and trust that highlights the role played by the generation of self-efficacy. We tackle head on a critique of this literature originally raised by Bauer *et al.* [2016] that, 'the research to date has done a far better job of establishing the effect of war violence on later cooperation than of explaining it.' Second, our analysis goes beyond the evidence from case studies in psychology on the aftermaths of extreme trauma. By constructing a granular typology of experiences of conflict to understand the drivers of self-efficacy, we strengthen the microfoundations linking conflict and trust. Our findings suggest this process starts early in life – as soon as memories start forming, and irrespective of whether individuals recall victimization years later. Our work adds to a nascent literature in economics on the role of memory and narratives/socialization on economic behavior, and bridge work on conflict and trust to the broader literature on the formation of economic preferences.[3]

By combining theory, measurement and evidence to take a new angle on the relationship between conflict and trust, we help reconcile why heterogeneous effects might be found across conflicts, and open avenues for future research on psychological legacies of traumatic events in early life on the formation of economic preferences. The insights go beyond the relationship between conflict and trust, and can be tailored and applied to other contexts studying responses to traumatic life events such as job loss, parental loss and exposure to violent crime for example.

Section 2 models conditional trust. Section 3 provides background on the Sierra Leonean civil war. Section 4 describes our data. Section 5 presents results on the relationship between exposure to conflict and trust. Section 6 uses the framework to analyze mechanisms linking conflict and trust. Section 7 moves beyond the framework to understand how experiences of conflict shape the generation of self-efficacy. Section 8 discusses how our model allows us to think about external validity and describes an agenda for future work. Additional results are in the Appendix.

[3]On memory, the focus has largely been on formalizing processes of recall, or understanding limitations that recall biases or motivated beliefs have for choices [Gennaioli and Shleifer 2010, Bordalo *et al.* 2020]. Economists increasingly recognize narratives shape expectations and macroeconomic outcomes [Shiller 2017], or political and moral choices [Bénabou *et al.* 2018]. On the formation of economic preferences, as these emerge in childhood and remain stable from late adolescence, many studies have focused on their intergenerational transmission [Dohmen *et al.* 2012, Doepke and Zilibotti 2017, Kosse *et al.* 2020, Chowdhury *et al.* 2022].

2 Modelling Conditional Trust

2.1 Set up

We develop a parsimonious framework to formalize the concept of conditional trust, linking exposure to conflict, self-efficacy and trust. This helps guide our empirical analysis and interpret the findings. We do so in the context of a static model of random pairwise interactions, that is appropriate for studying anonymized market exchange, which is critical to post-conflict recovery.

To begin with, suppose individuals can only either choose to trust (**T**) or not trust (**NT**) an anonymous partner when meeting them. Trusting others is a gamble with potential outcomes depending on whether the partner cooperates or not [Butler *et al.* 2016]. If the partner cooperates, the individual obtains a high payoff $\overline{c}$ with probability p, capturing the prior belief the individual holds that their partner cooperates. With probability $1-p$ the partner does not cooperate and the individual obtains the low payoff $\underline{c}$, normalized to zero. The alternative (safe) option is to not trust the partner, and obtain a guaranteed payoff $\widetilde{c}$ where $\underline{c} = 0 < \widetilde{c} < \overline{c}$.

Individuals have concave utility $u(.)$ with $u(0) = 0$. If the individual trusts her partner, her expected payoff is $pu(\overline{c}) + (1-p)u(\underline{c}) = pu(\overline{c})$. If she does not trust, her payoff is $u(\widetilde{c})$. Hence, if the agent's choice is restricted between trusting or not trusting, the individual prefers to trust if:

$$\mathbf{T} \succeq \mathbf{NT} : p \geq \frac{u(\widetilde{c})}{u(\overline{c})} = \alpha. \tag{1}$$

This captures the standard intuition that an individual is more likely to trust if their belief over the trustworthiness of their partner (p) is higher, the gains from cooperation ($\frac{1}{\alpha}$) are sufficiently high, or the individual is less risk averse.

We now introduce a third option: for the individual to conditionally trust their partner. Trust might be conditioned on either: (i) fixed characteristics of the partner, such as whether they belong to an ingroup or outgroup, that provide a signal of their trustworthiness; (ii) malleable characteristics of the partner, such as whether they are perceived to be open to behaving more cooperatively through persuasion or negotiation. The literature has largely focused on the first channel, and we complement this by considering the second. The notion is captured by assuming the individual can undertake actions at cost $k \in [0, K]$, to increase the probability of their partner cooperating from p to $\lambda(p)$ where $\lambda(p) \geq p$ for all $p \in (0,1)$, $\lambda(0) \geq 0$, and $\lambda(1) = 1$. This approach views the trustworthiness of others as open to change, and not a 'fixed type' or immutable even in one-shot anonymized interaction. Figure 1A shows an example $\lambda(p)$ function (in bold). $\lambda(p)$ need not be increasing everywhere, it is only assumed $\lambda(p) \geq p$ for all $p \in (0,1)$. The dashed $\lambda(p)$ function is also permissible.[4]

[4]This notion of conditional trust naturally relates to the long-standing strand of work from laboratory settings showing that many individuals behave as conditional cooperators in public goods games.

We use the catch-all term 'self-efficacy' to describe the belief the individual holds about their ability to increase the cooperation of others ($\lambda(p) - p$). Self-efficacy has gains and costs: the gains ($\lambda(p) - p$) relate to abilities to persuade, negotiate or bargain with others. The costs (k) relate to an individual's drive, grit or forward looking nature. We later describe how we empirically measure such gains and costs.

2.2 Solution

The expected payoff from conditionally trusting the partner is $\lambda(p)u(\bar{c}) + (1 - \lambda(p))u(\bar{c}) - k = \lambda(p)u(\underline{c}) - k$. With the option of conditional trust (**CT**), individuals differ along two dimensions: their beliefs about the trustworthiness of others, and their perceived self-efficacy to increase the trustworthiness of others. The following conditions describe when the individual prefers to conditionally trust their partner rather than trusting them outright, or not trusting them altogether:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{CT} &\succeq \mathbf{T} : [\lambda(p) - p]u(\bar{c}) \geq k, \\ \mathbf{CT} &\succeq \mathbf{NT} : [\lambda(p) - \alpha]u(\bar{c}) \geq k. \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

The solution is in Figure 1B. The regions correspond to parameter values over which the individual would prefer to trust, not trust, or conditionally trust. In the bottom-left corner, when belief over the trustworthiness of the partner (p) is very low, then even if the cost of self-efficacy (k) is low, the individual would prefer to not trust because the marginal gains from trusting (proportional to $\lambda(p) - p$) are too small. In the bottom-right corner, when p is very high then the individual does not need to rely on their self-efficacy, even if the cost of doing so is low, in order to trust. For intermediate values of p, the highest costs of self-efficacy can be borne to conditionally trust the partner.[5]

2.3 Mechanisms Linking Conflict and Trust

Self Efficacy Figure 1C shows the comparative statics on trust preferences if exposure to conflict leads, through gains in self-efficacy, $\lambda(p)$ to rise to $\lambda^*(p)$ where $\lambda^*(p) > \lambda(p)$ for all $p \in (0, 1)$. An increase in self-efficacy increases the likelihood of conditional trust, and causes *asymmetric* reductions in the likelihood of not trusting and of trusting others.

Two further points are of note. First, the model generates multiple reasons for why there are asymmetric impacts of conflict on trust preferences: the shape of $\lambda(p)$, and the joint distribution of p and k. As long as one of these is asymmetric, or asymmetrically impacted by conflict, the model generates asymmetric responses. Second, of course it need not be the case that exposure

[5] If $k = 0$ the model predicts the partner would never be trusted as $\mathbf{CT} \succeq \mathbf{T}$ when $k = 0$, and only the lowest p beliefs sustain not trusting as preferred to conditional trust. Given in our data, a large share of respondents report trusting others, the evidence does not support self-efficacy being costless.

to conflict leads to improvements in self-efficacy. Indeed, exposure to violence can have negative psychological impacts, such as increased anxiety [Jayawickreme and Blackie 2016]. If so, the comparative statics in Figure 1C are reversed. This is an issue we come back to discuss in relation to external validity and how the framework can help reconcile findings on the relationship between conflict and trust across settings.

Other Channels The framework is general enough to capture factors that have been emphasized in earlier work linking trust and conflict such as beliefs over others (p), the gains from cooperation ($\frac{1}{\alpha}$) and risk aversion. Consider first the idea that exposure to conflict changes beliefs about the trustworthiness of others. This can occur through three mechanisms: parochial norms, holding less extreme beliefs about others, and learning the trustworthiness of others.

On parochial norms, conflict might strengthen social preferences towards ingroups [Henrich and Boyd 2001]. This can be interpreted as p being a population-share weighted average of high beliefs of cooperation if matched to an ingroup member, and low beliefs of cooperation if matched to an outgroup member. How this impacts generalized trust depends on the likelihood of matching with an ingroup member, and the increased strength of ingroup cooperation caused by conflict.

Alternatively, conflict might cause individuals to hold less extreme beliefs over others – say because both acts of violence and acts of protection are experienced from others, irrespective of whether they belong to an ingroup. Hence the distribution of p moves away from the tails, as Figure 1D shows. If exposure to conflict operates through this mechanism, this implies a reduction in the likelihoods of not trusting and of outright trust, and an increase in the likelihood of conditional trust. The impact of exposure to conflict on trust preferences is then similar to when conflict raises the self-efficacy of individuals.

Finally, the model can be recast as one in which conflict allows individuals to learn about others if we interpret p as the prior belief held about the partner cooperating, and $\lambda(p)$ as the posterior belief after some signal of the partner's type is observed. In the current formulation $\lambda(p) > p$ so individuals only receive good news about the cooperativeness of others. With learning, individuals update their beliefs positively or negatively. The latter is more likely to occur the higher the prior belief is to begin with. Hence $\lambda(p)$ lies above p for low p and lies below p for high p. If exposure to conflict affects trust preferences through learning, the predicted effects on trust preferences are the *opposite* to what occurs if conflict and trust are also linked through self-efficacy.

A second class of explanation rooted in neoclassical approaches is that conflict increases the return to investing in social capital because of a loss of formal institutions during conflict, or as a way to build personal security. These channels are captured in the gains from cooperation, $\frac{1}{\alpha}$. As these rise, the model predicts outright trust rises, outright distrust falls, and conditional trust might rise or fall depending on $\lambda(.)$. Similarly if exposure to conflict increases risk aversion, this increases the threshold in p for the individual to prefer trusting the partner to not trusting them. This has more pronounced effects on shifting the tails of trust preferences from outright trust

towards outright distrust of others, while conditional trust might rise or fall.[6]

Finally, the framework encompasses an alternative interpretation of what respondents mean when they report conditional trust. If individuals provide this reply whenever they are close to indifference to trust or not trust others, the region of conditional trust just spans the threshold for p described in (1) and changes in self-efficacy have no impact on conditional trust – something that is testable and ruled out by our evidence.

3 Study Context: The Sierra Leonean Civil War

The framework developed is general enough to be applied to many conflict scenarios, but to narrow our focus, we note two features of the 1991-2002 civil war in Sierra Leone that have implications for our analysis. First, the violence largely did not operate along ethnic, religious or political party divides [Conibere *et al.* 2004, Humphreys and Weinstein 2006, Bellows and Miguel 2009]. As such, it might not be expected to strengthen ingroup ties or create increased animosity towards outgroups. Second, it is widely recognized as being characterized by indiscriminate episodes of violence and abuse of civilians from all armed sides in the conflict. The conflict spread in waves, rather than being concentrated in specific areas/cities. As a result, the decade long conflict spread to nearly all Chiefdoms in Sierra Leone, leaving the majority of individuals of both genders and all ages – potentially exposed to violence.

On the eve of the conflict, Sierra Leone was ranked 153rd out of 181 countries on GDP/capita. Three decades of one-party predatory rule by Siaka Stevens first and General Momoh later had left the country on the brink of economic collapse. The conflict began in March 1991 when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), with support from the special forces of Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), intervened to overthrow the Momoh government with the aim of ending corruption and ineptitude [Reno 1995, Richards 1996]. The RUF were the main perpetrators of violence, but had no political, ethnic or religious affiliation [Bellows and Miguel 2009]. They conscripted disenfranchised youths from across Sierra Leone as well as Liberian refugees. They also used child soldiers from Sierra Leone, many of whom were forced to abuse their own communities. Chiefdoms bordering Liberia experienced the most intense and prolonged exposure to violence because the RUF and NPFL entered Sierra Leone via Liberia, their headquarters were based there, and these Chiefdoms were also rich in diamonds – control of which helped finance the conflict.

By 1992 the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) had taken over the government. Like the RUF, they were drawn from across ethnic groups and employed child soldiers. As is well documented, the SLA and RUF coordinated movements to avoid direct battles, and sometimes made profit sharing

[6] There is mixed evidence on link between exposure to conflict and risk aversion. Some studies find evidence of higher risk taking using lab-in-the-field experiments [Voors *et al.* 2012], while others find evidence of lower risk taking or a stronger preference for certainty [Callen *et al.* 2014, Moya 2018, Jakiela and Ozier 2019].

arrangements in diamond areas. The extent of cooperation was such that some soldiers fought for the SLA by day and the RUF by night. As a result, the SLA engaged in looting to such an extent that they became known as 'rebels by night' and over time became largely indistinguishable from rebels in terms of violence towards civilians [Bellows and Miguel 2009].

In 1993 a government offensive supported by ECOMOG pushed the RUF back towards the Liberian border. However, the RUF regained territories, approaching the capital Freetown in 1995. This period saw the conflict spread to Chiefdoms in Southern and Western Sierra Leone. In 1997, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) split from the SLA, staged a coup, united with the RUF and took over Freetown [Keen 2005]. Looting, rape and murder followed, alongside a collapse of state institutions. To protect themselves from attack, many communities organized Civil Defense Forces (CDF). However, over time some CDF members also began to abuse civilians, enter the illicit diamonds trade, and utilize child soldiers [Keen 2005].

After a further brutal rebel attack on Freetown in 1999 and failed peace talks, in 2000 the UK, UN and Guinea intervened to conduct a disarmament campaign and secure a peace treaty – involving the demobilization of the RUF and the reintegration into society of its members. In January 2002 the civil war was declared to be over.

On the eve of the conflict in 1991, the population of Sierra Leone was 4.5 million. By its end, 2.5 million individuals had been displaced from their homes, $50,000$ were casualties/injured, and $18,000$ had died. Despite the collective trauma, the country experienced a period of post-conflict political stability and economic recovery. National elections were held in 2002, closely followed by the first local elections in decades in 2004.

We use the *Uppsala Conflict Data Program* (UCDP) as our key data source on conflict events during the civil war. This data codes conflict-related events based on official, NGO or journalistic records. A conflict event is defined as the use of armed forced by an organized actor against another, or against civilians, that resulted in at least one death. The data records the exact location and time of each event, the parties involved, the number of civilian casualties (and whether they occurred at the hands of rebels or state forces), and fatalities on each side. We retain those events for which the Chiefdom can be retrieved with confidence: this results in the selection of 1297 events (out of 1495 available in the UCDP data for the Sierra Leone civil war). We aggregate events to construct measures of violent conflict by Chiefdom-year. This aggregated measure of exposure to conflict enables us to capture the full typology of experiences of conflict we later consider. However, we also show robustness to using a more narrowly geographically constructed measure of conflict exposure at the village-year level.[7]

[7]This UCDP covers conflicts that cause at least 25 deaths in a given year. The alternative source to the UCDP used in conflict research is from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED). We use the UCDP because: (i) it spans the entire period of the civil war in Sierra Leone (while ACLED starts in 1997); (ii) ACLED has looser definitions of events and actors, and thus includes protests and troop movements; (iii) UCDP focuses on episodes of explicit violence against civilians – that are relevant for our research question; (iv) the UCDP data has been argued to have higher quality for the kinds of research question that we seek to address [Eck 2012].

Figure A1 shows the geographic spread of the conflict across the 149 Chiefdoms in Sierra Leone. Each panel shows the cumulative conflict in each Chiefdom, at four key dates: its initiation in 1991, when the RUF began to be pushed back by the SLA in 1993, the initial taking of Freetown by the RUF in 1997, and the conflict end in 2001. This shows how the conflict spread from close to the Liberian border, and this spread occurred in waves driven by political events exogenous to factors specific to any given Chiefdom. In all regions, we observe wide variation in cumulative conflict across Chiefdoms, and even among neighboring Chiefdoms.

Figure A2 shows the time series variation in conflict by Chiefdom, grouping the 14 districts into three regions. Within Chiefdom, a grey cell indicates a year of no conflict, and a red cell indicates a year with conflict. This highlights the intermittent nature of conflict within Chiefdoms: (i) while 98% of Chiefdoms experienced at least one conflict spell, more than 90% experienced gaps of at least a year between conflict episodes; (ii) the average number of consecutive years in which Chiefdoms experience conflict episodes is 1.6; (iii) the autocorrelation in casualty numbers within a conflict spell quickly falls, so as with the extensive margin of conflict, the intensity of conflict rises and falls sporadically within Chiefdoms over time. This evidence suggests that during the conflict it would have been difficult to migrate to avoid violence.

We also later document that few respondents migrated during the conflict, with the majority of cross-Chiefdom migration occurring post-conflict. Panel B of Figure A2 shows a histogram of year of birth in our sample: we observe a slight baby boom in the last year of the conflict, when it would be apparent that the conflict was over. We examine the robustness of our findings to concerns related to strategic migration or delay in fertility timing to avoid exposure to violence. In the Appendix we discuss the relevance of survivor bias for our analysis, something common to all studies on the impacts of conflict.[8]

4 Data and Empirical Method

4.1 Data Sources

Our data was collected as part of a wider project, evaluating a life skills intervention targeting young girls and women in 200 villages in four districts of Sierra Leone: Kambia, Moyamba, Pujehun and Port Loko [Bandiera *et al.* 2026]. That work explores how the intervention – delivered through the provision of safe spaces in villages – impacts outcomes related to schooling and pregnancy during the Ebola epidemic, that began just after the baseline data was collected. This paper focuses on the other aim of our original data collection: the long-term consequences of exposure to conflict during the civil war in shaping trust preferences expressed at baseline.

[8] Data from the 2004 census shows a steady upward trend in cohort size – starting from the 1970s – and this does not break with the conflict, nor does this trend change in the conflict years. Overall, census data do not suggest aggregate falls in fertility away from their long-term trend over the conflict. The census data confirms the finding in Figure A2, of an increase in cohort size in the final year of the conflict.

The baseline data was collected in 2014, from a random sample of young girls and women aged 12 to 24 resident in these villages. Respondents were born between 1990 and 2002 and we trim the sample to focus on those born during the civil war between 1991 and 2001 inclusive – corresponding to daughters of conflict survivors surveyed in Bellows and Miguel [2009].[9]

Table A2 presents descriptives of sample villages: the average village comprises 472 households, with adult employment rates being 80%. 16% of all villagers are women aged 12-25, and we randomly sample around half of them. Table A3 describes our core sample of young girls and women aged 12-25. 63% are in a relationship, 52% have ever been pregnant, 45% currently have children and 30% are married. The lower panels of Table A3 detail the social and economic transactions respondents engage in. They report spending around 29 hours/wk engaged in various leisure activities, split into around 6.4hrs/wk with friends, 5.4hrs/wk with men, 6hrs/wk alone and 11hrs/wk engaged in volunteering/church activities. In terms of school and work, 35% are engaged in work, 26% are enrolled in school full-time, 17% are engaged in work and at school, and the remaining 22% are engaged in home production. They report spending around 27 hours/wk in school, and an almost equal number of hours engaged in income generating activities. 24% are engaged in wage employment and 38% report engaging in self-employment. Among those that work, the most prevalent form of activity is petty trade (69%), 17% work in manufacturing, and 17% work in agriculture. Among those that work, around a third work at home or on their own land, and 36% work in a family business. Overall the evidence suggests girls in our sample have experience of anonymized transactions with others in the market place.[10]

4.2 Measuring Trust

We measure generalized trust at baseline using a question with similar wording to the World Values Survey or Afrobarometer: "*In general do you think people can be trusted, or that they cannot be trusted?*" Generalized trust is most relevant for one-off anonymized interaction, as in our framework. In contrast to most cross-country surveys, we allow respondents to answer yes, no, or 'it depends' (as well as allowing for don't know or refusals). 11% of respondents say no (so report outright distrust of others), 37% say yes, and 51% say 'it depends' – what we refer to as conditional trust. Those expressing conditional trust might be indicating they need to know more about the other person – either their fixed characteristics because they signal their trustworthiness, or their malleable characteristics suggesting they are open to act cooperatively through persuasion or negotiation. The response 'it depends' does not reflect respondent uncertainty: no respondents answered the trust question with 'don't know' or refused to answer. We later show that trust preferences do not correlate with indecisiveness as measured in other survey modules.

[9] Given the survey covered sensitive subjects related to conflict, risky behaviors, and intimate partner violence, interviews were conducted by a trained group of women enumerators.

[10] Respondents identify with one of ten ethnic groups/tribes. In our analysis we include dummies for the three largest groups: Mende, Temne and Limba. The other seven (3% of the sample) are the excluded category.

Correlates of Conditional Trust To help validate our measure of conditional trust, we document outcomes it correlates with along two margins: savings and employment. To begin with, we explore how conditional trust correlates to savings, and ROSCA participation. These results are in Columns 1 to 3 of Table 1. Those expressing conditional trust are significantly more likely to have savings, and to hold these savings at home, relative to those that express outright trust or distrust in others. They are not more likely to participate in ROSCAs. The remaining Columns of Table 1 consider employment outcomes: we see that those expressing conditional trust are more likely to engage in income generating activities, and work longer hours, than those expressing outright trust or distrust in others. They are also more likely to be self-employed.

4.3 Measuring Exposure to Conflict

Migration Journals We measure individual exposure to conflict using migration journals collected from respondents in 2016. Trust preferences do not correlate with attrition (Column 1 of Table A4), and this remains true conditioning on individual and village controls (Column 2).[11]

For the migration journals, we asked individuals their entire history of Chiefdoms of residence, from their place of birth through to their current Chiefdom. We thus build migration histories spanning conflict and post-conflict years. We record each Chiefdom resided in for at least six months over this period. For each migration spell we record the Chiefdom, year of the start/end of the spell. To construct individual measures of exposure to conflict, we geo-reference the information from migration journals to UCDP geo-coded conflict data. This matching by Chiefdom-year allows us to construct: (i) on the extensive margin, whether the individual was exposed to conflict because they were ever in the vicinity of conflict (in the same Chiefdom-year as a conflict event); (ii) on the intensive margin, the cumulative exposure to conflict at any given age. To get a sense of what it means to be in the vicinity of conflict, on average Chiefdoms have an area of 480km^2, equivalent to one-third the size of London or the same as Nashville.[12]

Working Sample Figure A3 presents a consort diagram detailing how we move from the baseline data to the working sample. We start with 5775 respondent observations at baseline, of which 4798 (83%) are tracked to endline – we have migration diaries for this tracked sample. We drop

[11] Reliable data on age is determined through age and year of birth being consistent across surveys, the place of birth is known and the migration journal does not have missing spells. Alternatively, there might be minor inconsistencies in reported age across surveys, but the respondent is either exposed or not exposed to conflict regardless of the implied year of birth. 98% of the tracked sample follow one of these routes.

[12] Displacements of residence *within* Chiefdom are not recorded. This differs from measures of internally displaced individuals recorded in UCDP data (that measure displacements to any different location, including within Chiefdom) and also might differ from what individuals provide in self-reported victimization data. For example, there are accounts from the conflict of entire communities temporarily displacing themselves to the outskirts of their villages in advance of troop arrivals. We also asked respondents to provide the reason for each change of residence: in most cases this is missing, reflecting that girls were in childhood during the conflict and often do not know the reason for household migration.

respondents born after the civil war ($N = 294$), and those that have unreliable migration history data ($N = 317$). For 296 respondents we cannot accurately construct our later measure of experiences of conflict, leaving a working sample of 3891 observations. This is the sample used for our core results on the impact of exposure to conflict on trust, and of experiences of conflict.

The 3891 respondents collectively report 7230 migration spells. 63% still reside in their Chiefdom of birth. Only 14% migrated during the conflict – the majority of cross-Chiefdom migration occurs post-conflict (only 11% of migration spells occurred after the Ebola pandemic). While our sample was drawn from those resident in 23 Chiefdoms across 4 districts, given migration histories, respondents are drawn from 96 Chiefdoms of birth across 13 districts.

Descriptives Table 2 describes exposure to conflict. For the working sample in Column 1, 62% of respondents have ever lived in a Chiefdom where conflict occurred. Conditional on exposure, 45% were born into conflict. The vast majority (98%) were exposed in their Chiefdom of birth – very few individuals migrated prior to being exposed in their Chiefdom of birth. This reflects the low levels of migration during the conflict, and the difficulty of migrating to avoid conflict. Conditional on exposure, the average respondent was first exposed to conflict at age 1.5, and cumulatively exposed to around ten violent events. For individuals who migrated during the conflict, they did so once, while 68% of respondents migrated post conflict. Columns 2 and 3 show that migrants are more likely to be in the vicinity of conflict at some point, cumulatively exposed to more conflict events, and more likely to migrate post-conflict.

To dig into any link between migration and conflict exposure, Panels A and B of Figure A4 show cumulative conflict exposure in Chiefdoms of birth, and Chiefdoms of residence when migration journals were collected. For those who migrated during the conflict, the lower panels show how origin and destination Chiefdoms compare in terms of: (i) the difference in the total number of episodes of violence at the time of migration; (ii) the difference in the total number of episodes of violence post-migration. Panels C and D show histograms of each difference. For both, there is a mass point in the difference in conflict intensity at zero. Hence for the small share of respondents who migrated during the conflict, we do not find systematic evidence of migration to Chiefdoms with less conflict.

The main correlate of exposure to conflict on the extensive and intensive margins is age (equivalent to year of birth) – as shown in Panel A of Table A5. Although dummies for tribe are collectively significant this likely reflects their geographic distribution. In line with narratives of the war, factors such as family background, being part of a ruling family and religion are not predictive of exposure. This is reconfirmed in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 2 that compare exposure to conflict between those from ruling families to those from non-ruling families. We do not find stark differences in their exposure to conflict on either extensive or intensive margins, or their propensity to migrate during the conflict.[13]

[13] A respondent belongs to a ruling family if household members are eligible for the role of Paramount Chief

4.4 Empirical Method

To analyze the relationship between exposure to conflict during the civil war and generalized trust measured more than a decade later, we treat generalized trust preferences – yes, no, it depends – as a sequence of unordered alternatives. The framework makes clear that allowing the flexibility for exposure to conflict to have non-monotonic impacts on trust preferences is critical for understanding their link. We thus use the following model-consistent multinomial logit model:

$$\begin{aligned} log\left(\frac{\mathbb{P}\left[\text{trust=Yes} \mid C_i, \mathbf{X}_i\right]}{\mathbb{P}\left[\text{trust=It Depends} \mid C_i, \mathbf{X}_i\right]}\right) &= C_i\beta_Y + \mathbf{X}_i\gamma_Y, \\ log\left(\frac{\mathbb{P}\left[\text{trust=No} \mid C_i, \mathbf{X}_i\right]}{\mathbb{P}\left[\text{trust=It Depends} \mid C_i, \mathbf{X}_i\right]}\right) &= C_i\beta_N + \mathbf{X}_i\gamma_N, \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

where $C_i = 1$ for those exposed to conflict, namely if any conflict episode took place in the respondent's Chiefdom of residence while they resided there. Standard errors are clustered by village of residence at baseline. In each batch of three columns we show the average marginal effects for each trust response $j \in \{No, It\ Depends, Yes\}$:

$$\delta_j = \mathbb{E}_i\left(\mathbb{P}\left[trust = j \mid \mathbf{X}_i, C_i = 1\right] - \mathbb{P}\left[trust = j \mid \mathbf{X}_i, C_i = 0\right]\right), \tag{4}$$

The coefficient of interest δ_j is the average marginal effect on trust response j between those never exposed to conflict ($C_i = 0$) to those exposed to conflict ($C_i = 1$), holding constant other covariates $\mathbf{X}_i$. These covariates are chosen on the basis that they are pre-determined prior to the conflict. These include age and other individual characteristics that correlate to exposure to conflict (Table A5), as well as geography-based controls that help condition out local factors that might drive trust preferences such as the prevalence of self-employment or post-conflict support programs. We later show the robustness of our main findings to LASSO selection of covariates.[14]

5 Results: Conflict and Trust

Table 3 presents our baseline result linking the geo-coded measure of being exposed to conflict, when respondents were aged 0 to 11, to trust preferences expressed 14 years later. Irrespective of the set of controls, those exposed to conflict are significantly more likely to report conditional trust ('it depends') rather than outright trust or distrust in others. When all covariates are conditioned on in Columns 2a-2c, the marginal effect of ever being exposed to conflict increases conditional trust by 7.6pp, corresponding to a 15% increase over the level of conditional trust among those

(district -level) and sub-Chief (chiefdom level).

[14] $\mathbf{X}_i$ includes age (where we allow for a cubic polynomial in age at baseline), father's education, ruling family status, religion and tribe dummies, village size, the average poverty score of households in the village of residence at baseline, and district of birth dummies.

never exposed to conflict. The estimated effect is significant at the 1% level. This increase in conditional trust arises because of a significant reduction in those reporting outright trust of others (the marginal effect on trusting others falls by 6pp or 15% relative to those not exposed to conflict). The point estimate of the likelihood of respondents reporting outright distrust in others is also negative but imprecisely estimated. We cannot reject equality of shifts from yes/no towards conditional trust ($p = .249$).

Four points are of note. First, the finding that exposure to conflict has persistent effects on trust preferences means there are no strong general equilibrium effects, where all individuals – even those never exposed – converge to conditional trust preferences as a best response to those that were exposed to conflict, through some process of collective coping.

Second, that trust preferences non-monotonically move in from both extremes towards conditional trust is revealing. Had we used the simpler categorization of yes/no answers and modeled those as ordered choices, then those answering 'it depends' would be shifted to these tails. This makes it more likely that no change in trust preferences is detected, in line with the meta-analysis of Bauer *et al.* [2016]. The framework makes precise exactly how those expressing conditional trust would be reallocated to yes/no responses if only those were allowed.[15]

Third, we can use the geo-coded measure to examine whether there is any relationship between the intensive margin of exposure to conflict and trust preferences. We do so by estimating a specification analogous to (3) but where we control for the number of episodes exposed to, or the number of casualties in the episodes exposed to (in each case we take an *asinh* transformation to account for a mass point of zero because 39% of respondents are never exposed to conflict). The results are in Table A6 and show a dose response: being exposed to more conflict is associated with a higher likelihood of reporting conditional trust.[16]

Fourth, we can take an additional prediction of the model to data, namely that an increase in the cost of conditional trust (k) should: (i) decrease conditional trust; (ii) increase the incidence of outright not trusting others, and outright trusting others, as Figure A5 illustrates. To operationalize this, we use as a proxy for k respondent's reported dissatisfaction with their community, the idea being that dissatisfied women likely face higher costs of enforcing cooperation with others, all else equal. Table A7 additionally controls for this proxy of k in our baseline specification. We find

[15] Those to the right of the threshold in (1) would report outright trust (rather than conditional trust), and those to the left of the threshold would report outright distrust. These reallocations would not be of equal magnitude, and depend on the $\lambda(p)$ and $u(.)$. In our data, among those not exposed (38% of respondents), 12% say no, 39% say yes, and 49% say it depends. While the WVS is not conducted in Sierra Leone, we can draw a comparison with the 2012 Afrobarometer survey in Sierra Leone (close to the time of our baseline), that is based on a sample of 600. This asks respondents the general trust question in a format close to that used in the WVS: 20% of respondents report outright distrust of others, and 78% report outright trust of others (with 2% reporting don't know). The breakdown is similar if we focus on those aged 18-25 in 2012. Comparing these distributions of trust preferences across our baseline and Afrobarometer surveys, suggests 16% of those that report conditional trust would shift to reporting outright distrust of others, while 84% of them would shift to reporting outright trust in others.

[16] This is not to be interpreted as the percentage change but as the effect on a one unit change in the inverse hyperbolic sine of the number of conflicts exposed to.

those with more reported dissatisfaction with their community (a higher k) report significantly lower conditional trust, and significantly higher levels of outright distrust in others (outright trust in others also increases but is not precisely estimated) – in line with the model. In addition, we note the coefficients on how exposure to conflict relate to trust preferences remain virtually unchanged from the baseline specification, suggesting changes in the costs of conditional trust do not further operate through shifting the lambda function.

5.1 Robustness Checks

Our first robustness check uses more precise geo-coded data to measure exposure to conflict at the village level (rather than the Chiefdom level). This is slightly different in spirit to our core approach in which we focus on a wider notion of exposure that involves conflict being in the vicinity but not in the village directly. This is what allows us to later build a rich typology of direct and indirect experiences of conflict, and then examine how these experiences shape self-efficacy and mediate the relationship between conflict and trust. However, it remains instructive to use a more localized measure that better captures direct exposure and is closer to the approach used in much of the literature described in Table A1. While we can accurately use such localized measures of exposure for girls and young women that continue to reside in their village of birth, the measure is more unreliable for those that migrated at any point of their lives – because recall of exact village names that migrants used to reside in are often missing, not recalled, or unknown (precisely because girls moved from those villages at an early age).

Nevertheless for the subsample of 1238 non-migrants, we are able to proceed reliably as follows. For each village in our sample, we use GPS data to compute the number of episodes of conflict that occurred within a fixed 2km radius of the village each year. We compute individual level exposure by cumulating these measures based on respondents' year of birth and village of residence. We then use this individual measure of exposure to conflict in our main specification (3) for non-migrants. The results are in Table 4: we find results similar to our core finding. Specifically, Columns 1a-1c show that exposure to very localized conflict increases conditional trust ($p = .086$) and significantly reduces outright distrust in others. These results become slightly more imprecise in this smaller sample of stayers when we condition our full set of covariates in Columns 2a-2c, but the point estimate of exposure to conflict on conditional trust remains positive, and such localized exposure significantly reduces the likelihood of reported outright distrust in others.[17]

In the Appendix we further discuss the robustness of our baseline result by establishing it

[17] For completeness, we repeat the exercise for migrants. For this subsample the highly localized measure of conflict exposure relates to the experience of residents in their host village (not their place of birth). This makes the impacts harder to interpret than for stayers because selective migration into different communities might play a role. The result is in Table A8 where we see that the localized conflict of villages that migrants end up residing in does not correlate to their trust preferences (in line with the evidence from Figure A4). The fact that a residence-based measure of highly localized exposure to conflict generates different effects for migrants and non-migrants suggests our main result is not just capturing local conditions, but rather individual experiences of conflict.

is replicated when: (i) using alternative econometric models or accounting for enumerator effects (Table A9); (ii) covariate selection through LASSO (Table A10); (iii) controlling for specific village characteristics to address the concern that post-conflict reconstruction might have been targeted to villages more exposed to conflict and this in turn drives conditional trust (Table A11); (iv) using a measure for distance to conflict that accounts for individuals being affected by conflict in neighboring Chiefdoms (Table A12). We also show the results on conditional trust do not reflect indecisiveness among those exposed to conflict, and nor do they reflect those exposed to conflict having smaller social networks and so being more uncertain of the trustworthiness of others for anonymized exchange (Table A13).

5.2 Underpinning a Causal Interpretation

A primary empirical concern in the literature on conflict and trust is reverse causality: those with higher levels of trust are more likely to have been exposed to conflict, and have survived the conflict. In our context the concern is modified given: (i) the notion of conditional trust, so that such reverse causality would have to apply to a greater extent to those expressing conditional trust in others, rather than outright distrust or outright trust in others; (ii) our geo-coded measure of exposure to conflict is independent of respondents being able to recall victimization.

Nevertheless, in the Appendix we further discuss three strategies to underpin a causal interpretation: (i) examining how the results vary in alternative subsamples related to the fact that variation in geo-coded exposure to conflict arises from three sources – year of birth, Chiefdom of birth, migration during or post-conflict, that address concerns related to respondents sorting into villages based on their trust preferences (Table A14); (ii) presenting placebo checks to strengthen the evidence that actual exposure to violence matters, not other geographic factors correlated with conflict including pre-war confounders, or experiences of internal migration or displacement *per se* (Table A15); (iii) using an IV approach, where we predict exposure to conflict exploiting the geographic and temporal patterns of the conflict (Table A15). The bottom line from these differing approaches is the same: those exposed to conflict are significantly more likely to report conditional trust, and are less likely to express outright distrust or outright trust in others.

6 Mechanisms

We now use the framework to help understand what drives the robust link between exposure to conflict and conditional trust. We first describe how we measure self-efficacy and establish that exposure to conflict correlates to self-efficacy. We then examine whether the interplay between exposure to conflict, self-efficacy and trust preferences matches predictions of the model, and which other mechanisms linking conflict and trust are relevant in our setting.

6.1 Measuring Self-Efficacy

Self-efficacy is a concept developed in psychology to describes one's perceived ability to execute actions required to reach a particular goal [Bandura 1977]. In Bandura's original formulation, perceived self-efficacy can be derived from accomplishments, vicarious experiences, verbal persuasion and physiological states. A widely used scale to measure self-efficacy is that developed by Schwarzer and Jerusalem [1995]. This 10-question scale predicts the ability of individuals to cope and adapt to everyday circumstances after having experienced stressful life events – such as exposure to violence. While self-efficacy is distinct from traits such as locus of control, they are related and self-efficacy scales are indeed often validated through their correlations with these other constructs. As the concept of self-efficacy has started to enter economic analysis, its measurement has been tailored to specific cases [McKelway 2021].[18]

In our context, self-efficacy relates to one's perceived ability to undertake costly actions (k) to increase the cooperativeness of others ($\lambda(p) - p$). We measure self-efficacy using a 21-question scale elicited at baseline. Rather than pick and choose specific questions, for transparency we construct an overall index of self-efficacy using all questions across five dimensions: (i) locus of control; (ii) drive, grit and leadership; (iii) enforcement and persuasion; (iv) entrepreneurial skills; (v) future planning.[19]

This aggregate measure aims to strike a balance between capturing the psychological concept and being tailored to our research question. Our measure purposively correlates to concepts such

[18] The questions asked in the Schwarzer and Jerusalem [1995] index are: (i) I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough; (ii) if someone opposes me, I can find means and ways to get what I want; (iii) it is easy for me to stick to my aims and accomplish my goals; (iv) I am confident that I could deal efficiently with unexpected events; (v) thanks to my resourcefulness, I know how to handle unforeseen situations; (vi) I can solve most problems if I invest the necessary effort; (vii) I can remain calm when facing difficulties because I can rely on my coping abilities; (viii) when I am confronted with a problem, I can usually find several solutions; (ix) if I am in a bind, I can usually think of something to do; (x) no matter what comes my way, I'm usually able to handle it. Responses are coded on a 4-point Likert scale from 'not at all true' to 'exactly true'.

[19] Under locus of control, we asked respondents' agreement with the following statements about themselves: (i) I am in control of what happens in my life; (ii) I do not care what others think about my success or failure; (iii) I believe that my future is determined by luck no matter how hard I work. Under drive, grit and leadership, we asked: (i) while doing any task, it is important for me to do it better than others; (ii) I want to be respected in my village; (iii) if I have the chance, I would make a good leader; (iv) if I start working on a task, I definitely see the end of it no matter how difficult it is. Under enforcement and persuasion, we elicited self-reported abilities to perform the following tasks: (i) collect money someone owes you; (ii) bargain to obtain high prices when you are selling outputs; (iii) bargain to obtain cheap prices when you are buying inputs; (iv) make sure your employees get work done properly. Under entrepreneurial skills, we elicited self-reported abilities to perform the following tasks: (i) find information about paid work opportunities in your community; (ii) protect your business assets from harm by others; (iii) identify opportunities to start a new business; (iv) run your own business; (v) manage financial accounts, and agreement with the statement that, (vi) a person can get rich by taking risks. Finally, under future planning, we elicited the ability to (i) save in order to invest in future business opportunities; (ii) obtain credit to start a new business/expand an existing business; and measured agreement with the statements (iii) I often make plans for the future; (iv) I save regularly. For questions related to entrepreneurial skills, responses were recorded on a 1-10 point Likert scale ranging from 'definitely cannot do this', to 'can definitely do this'. For questions related to personal traits, responses to each were again recorded on a 1-10 point Likert scale ranging from 'definitely false', to 'definitely true'.

as locus of control, but also captures elements of grit, determination, self-image, cooperation, persuasion and communication skills, sometimes related to entrepreneurial activities in which one-off anonymized exchange with others plays a major role. This links our measure of self-efficacy to work from laboratory settings showing that pre-play communication among anonymous partners, even if cheap talk, can enhance subsequent cooperation and trust [Charness and Dufwenberg 2006, Ederer and Schneider 2022]. This is in line with our idea that malleable characteristics of partners, such as being open to persuasion or negotiation, can lead to them behaving more cooperatively.

At the same time, given it is not necessary that all components equally capture the notion of self-efficacy, we also construct separate indices for the five dimensions of self-efficacy, and show impacts of each dimension separately, as well as of each component in the 21-question scale. Our aggregate measure of self-efficacy, as well as the various indices capturing its components, are constructed as inverse covariance weighted indices [Anderson 2008]. These indices are standardized relative to mean and standard deviation of the excluded group in each regression (which in most cases are respondents not exposed to conflict), so associations are interpreted as effect sizes.

6.2 Self-efficacy and Conflict

We first provide evidence that self-efficacy is shifted by conflict as a first step in the causal chain linking conflict and trust. We estimate the partial correlation between being exposed to conflict and the aggregate index of self-efficacy, conditioning on the same controls as in (3): those exposed to conflict do have higher self-efficacy than those never exposed, as measured 14 years later. The magnitude of the difference is an effect size on self-efficacy of $.063\sigma$.[20]

Given not all five components in the aggregate measure of self-efficacy need be equally good at capturing the underlying concept, we repeat the exercise separately for each dimension of self-efficacy, as well as separately for each individual question. Figure 2 summarizes the results: those exposed to conflict have different levels of self-efficacy as measured more than a decade later across a number of dimensions. The strongest impacts are found for dimensions related to future planning ($.160\sigma$, $p = .003$), followed by the dimension of drive, grit and leadership ($.134\sigma$, $p = .004$), and the dimension of enforcement and persuasion ($.078\sigma$, $p = .086$). Generally weaker impacts are found for dimensions of self-efficacy related to entrepreneurial skills and locus of control.

6.3 Self-efficacy and Trust

We now re-examine the link between conflict and trust by estimating (3), additionally controlling for self-efficacy. The results are in Table 6 where we report average marginal effects. Columns 1a-1c show that the aggregate index of self-efficacy correlates to trust preferences. A one standard

[20] That self-efficacy increases for those exposed to conflict is relative to those not exposed but still in Sierra Leone. We do not have a counterfactual to compare self-efficacy to those never exposed to conflict. Hence it could still be the case that self-efficacy is lower than if conflict had never occurred.

deviation increase in self-efficacy is associated with a significantly higher likelihood of conditional trust: the magnitude of the effect is 5.3pp, corresponding to a 11% increase over the level of conditional trust among those never exposed to conflict. The effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. This increase in conditional trust arises because of a reduction in those reporting outright trust of others (the marginal effect of trusting others reduces by 5pp). Higher self-efficacy is asymmetrically associated with trust preferences: we can reject equality of shifts from yes/no towards conditional trust ($p = .000$).

Given conflict is more strongly correlated to some dimensions of the self-efficacy index, Columns 2a-2c repeat the exercise controlling for all dimensions separately. We find trust preferences are associated with each dimension of self-efficacy but in line with the results from Figure 2, the strongest association is found with future planning, and drive, grit and leadership (exactly those dimensions most associated to exposure to conflict). We find those with greater self-efficacy along these dimensions are significantly more likely to conditionally trust, and significantly less likely to outright distrust others. We continue to find a significant partial correlation between exposure to conflict and conditional trust. Exposure to conflict continues to significantly impact the likelihood of reporting outright trust in others, and the likelihood of reporting conditional trust in others falls by just under 20%, from .076 to .063. In line with the framework, this suggests that self-efficacy mediates a share of the effect of exposure to conflict on trust preferences, but there remain other channels through which exposure to conflict affects trust. Our framework parsimoniously captures many of these channels. The ones that we can take to data most readily relate to conflict changing beliefs about the trustworthiness of others either through holding less extreme beliefs about others, or the strengthening of parochial norms.[21]

6.4 Beliefs Over Others and Trust

As explained earlier, if conflict causes individuals to hold less extreme beliefs over others – say because both acts of violence and acts of protection are experienced – the impact of exposure to conflict on trust preferences is similar to if conflict raises the self-efficacy of individuals, and the two channels reinforce each other. This can explain why we continue to find a direct effect of exposure to conflict on conditional trust. We probe the issue using directly measured beliefs individuals hold over the trustworthiness of others in specific groups. More precisely, at baseline we asked respondents, "How many people in *[group]* can you trust?" with potential responses being none, some, most, and all. We do so for ingroups of respondents (residents of their village, other women, those attending their same church/mosque, those of the same religion), and for outgroups (men, those of a different religion, whites). We asked similar question about groups

[21] Other channels could include that conflict increases the return to investing in social capital because of a loss of formal institutions during conflict, or as a way to build personal safety and security ($\frac{1}{\alpha}$). We cannot capture these channels in our data.

related to state and market institutions – police officers, politicians, those in national government, those in local government, banks and money lenders.

We use these beliefs over others to estimate a specification analogous to (3) and examine the relationship between conflict exposure and responses to the question of how many in each group can be trusted. Figure 3 summarizes the results, showing the average marginal effect of being exposed on each response (none, some, most, and all). We see a remarkably consistent pattern: respondents report being significantly less likely to trust no one, or trust nearly everyone, in each group. They are however significantly more likely to report trusting some in each group. That this applies across groups is in line with narratives of the civil war in Sierra Leone being a conflict not rooted along ethnic, religious or political divides. This result runs counter to the notion that in this particular civil war, exposure to conflict leads to parochial altruism or greater trust in ingroups at the expense of less trust towards outgroups, and this is what explains the rise in conditional trust.

7 How Does Conflict Shape Self-Efficacy?

A key insight of our analysis is that self-efficacy mediates the link between exposure to conflict and trust preferences. However, less is known about *how* violent conflict translates into building self-efficacy. To make inroads on the issue, we move beyond the confines of the framework and exploit the full richness of our data to construct a granular typology of *experiences* of conflict, combining information on: (i) the geo-coded measure of exposure to conflict; (ii) whether an individual reports being victimized during the civil war; (iii) ages at which the individual was exposed to (geo-coded) conflict. This sheds light on how direct exposure to conflict, memories of conflict, and narratives/socialization around conflict, each distinctively shape self-efficacy.

7.1 Constructing Experiences of Conflict

7.1.1 Self-reported Victimization

At baseline, we collected first-person accounts of direct exposure to violence during the civil war. The forms of victimization asked about are comparable to those in Bellows and Miguel [2009]: whether there was fighting in their area, they were personally harmed, their family was harmed, they were a refugee overseas, or they were internally displaced. For each type of victimization, we ask individuals whether they recall being victimized in this way during the conflict. They can respond with yes, no, or state they were too young/do not recall. For those that report they were too young/do not recall all dimensions of victimization, we refer to them as not recalling the war.

In our sample of young women aged 12-24 at baseline and 14 years after the end of the conflict: (i) 62% are identified by our geo-coded measure to have been exposed to conflict (Table 2); (ii) 54%

recall the civil war; (iii) 46% recall some form of victimization. Reassuringly, among the sample reporting any victimization, the correlates of being exposed to conflict remain largely unchanged (Table A5, Columns 3 and 4).

The left hand panel of Figure 4A shows that among those reporting victimization, 77% observed fighting in their area, 62% were internally displaced, 41% had their family harmed, 12% were a refugee overseas, and 6% were personally harmed. This ranking fits accounts of the civil war, with conflict occurring in nearly every Chiefdom, the majority of the population being displaced, and violence being inflicted on civilians by all parties. The fact that respondents were born into the conflict also helps explain the low levels of personal harm reported relative to reports of family members being harmed.

Column 5 in Table A5 shows correlates of recalling any victimization: age is the predominant predictor of recalling victimization, while parental education or being part of a ruling family do not predict recall. Columns 6 to 11 in Table A5 shows correlates of types of victimization: age is again positively correlated to reports of family being harmed, being internally displaced or there being fighting in their area. In line with accounts of the civil war, we find those from ruling families are more likely to report being a refugee overseas.[22]

The right hand panel of Figure 4A shows how the geo-coded measures of exposure, recall of the war, and victimization relate to each other. Among those geo-coded to be in the vicinity of conflict, 64% recall the war, and conditional on recall, 86% report being victimized. Hence 55% recall the war *and* being victimized. Among those geo-coded never to have been in the vicinity of conflict, 39% recall the war, and conditional on this recall, 63% recall being victimized. Hence 25% recall the war *and* being victimized. As expected, there is an imperfect mapping between the geo-coded and self-reported measures of exposure to conflict.

However these discrepancies are informative, as long as they are not driven by measurement error, as we later address. The discrepancies are informative because our sample were all born during the conflict, and hence might be too young to themselves recall events – but rather report conflict narratives handed to them from parents and others. Digging into this further, Figure 4B details how the geo-coded measure of exposure to conflict, recall of the civil war, and reporting any form of victimization, vary with age. As expected, all three measures increase with age. For cohorts born later in the conflict (and so with a lower age in 2001), the gap between victimization rates and actual vicinity to conflict are greatest. These series narrow with age (as we move to the right hand side of the figure). For those born early in the conflict, and so aged 6 and above by the end of the civil war, there is near convergence in rates of victimization and the geo-coded measure of residing in the vicinity of conflict.

[22] Our sample of respondents born into the civil war corresponds to the daughters of the generation of conflict survivors surveyed in Bellows and Miguel [2009]. They find that 44% of respondents reported a family member being killed during the conflict; 35% had a family member being injured (close to the figure in our sample); 38% report being refugees during the conflict (that is far higher than in our sample).

7.1.2 A Typology of Experiences

We combine data on the geo-coded measure of exposure to conflict, self-reported recall and victimization, and information on ages of exposure to construct a typology of experiences of conflict. Age of exposure is critical because memory formation begins largely after age three. It is thus useful to consider if an individual was aged 0-2 when exposed to conflict (prior to significant memory formation), or was aged 3 and above when exposed to conflict, and hence more capable of retaining first-hand memories of violence. For each period in a respondent's life – when aged 0-2 and when aged 3 onwards, we consider whether the individual: (i) was exposed to conflict using the geo-coded measure; (ii) recalls any form of victimization. This provides an 8-way mutually exclusive classification of respondents, as shown in Figure 5. We use this 8-way classification to group respondents into five distinct *experiences* of civil war. Our approach means we do not rely on respondents themselves recalling the age at which they were victimized during the conflict.

Our objective is to distinguish between respondents who are more likely to be suppressing memories of conflict, those that are more likely to have direct first hand accounts of conflict, and those whose narrative of conflict is more likely to be second-hand.

Consider those with recall of victimization (rows 1, 3, 5 and 7 in Figure 5). For those in rows 1 and 5, neither group were in the vicinity of conflict from age 3 onwards, when direct memories would be forming, yet they recall being victimized. We refer to these individuals as having been 'socialized', in that their recall of victimization is more likely to stem from narratives told to them rather than from direct experience. Socialization during childhood can affect attitudes later in life because children rely on parents for priors that shape their responses to new information [Dohmen *et al.* 2012, Doepke and Zilibotti 2017, Kosse *et al.* 2020, Malmendier 2021, Chowdhury *et al.* 2022]. Given existing work on the long-term effects of intergenerational socialization, this experience forms a natural benchmark from which to evaluate other experiences of conflict. 17% of respondents fall into this type.

In contrast, those in rows 3 and 7 were in the vicinity of conflict from age 3 onwards, when direct memories are more likely to form, *and* they recall being victimized. We refer to these individuals as having experienced conflict 'directly'. 27% of respondents fall into this type.

We next consider those with no recall of victimization during the civil war, corresponding to rows 2, 4, 6 and 8 in Figure 5. While these might typically be grouped together in work using self-reported recall, we provide a finer distinction among them.

Respondents in row 2 are never in the vicinity of conflict at any stage of childhood, nor do they recall victimization. The civil war took place in their country, but they did not experience it first hand because they were born after the violence took place (or more rarely they moved Chiefdom prior to violence occurring). We refer to this group as having been exposed to a 'background narrative' experience of the civil war: 29% of respondents are of this type.[23]

[23]This group comprises those that survived the civil war but did not experience it first hand. This is not the

Those in rows 4 and 8 were all in the vicinity of conflict at age 3 or later, yet they do not report recalling any victimization, including fighting in their area. We thus refer to these groups as 'traumatized' in that their experience of the conflict leads them to suppress memories – they are unwilling to talk about any form of victimization. 13% of respondents fall into this type.

Finally, those in row 6 were not in the vicinity of conflict from age 3 onwards, nor do they recall any victimization. These respondents are similar to those with a background narrative except they were exposed to violent events when aged 0 to 2 – yet narratives of these events have not been passed onto them across generations by their guardians. Their experience of conflict is filtered through their parents and others, who might either be deliberately trying to protect children, or who themselves might be traumatized and so unable to pass on such narratives. We refer to this group of respondents as those with parental protection/trauma: 15% fall into this type.

We thus produce a mutually exclusive five-way typology of experiences of civil war: those socialized, those with direct experience, those with a background narrative, those traumatized, and those whose parents are protective/traumatized. Each group is well represented (with the smallest group still having 13% of respondents in it). Of course we fully recognize there can be issues of measurement error and the interpretation of any constructed typology – issues we come back to later. Our terminology reflects experiences that are, on balance, more likely to have occurred in any given group, while obviously being far from definitive (and all potentially encompassing some element of intergenerational transmission). This still allows us to take first step in advancing the literature to understand which experiences matter for generating self-efficacy, and thus shape trust preferences later in life.

7.2 Descriptive Evidence

To aid the interpretation of this typology, Table 6 provides descriptive evidence on individuals by their experiences of conflict. Panel A shows that as expected, those with direct experience of conflict or those traumatized by conflict are older (and so exposed to more years of the civil war). Given some of the experiences relate to narratives/socialization or parental protection/trauma, it is useful to note that the incidence of parental death is low: 5.8% of respondents report having their father die during the period of the civil war, and only 2% report their mother dying during that period. As might be intuitive: (i) those with direct experience or trauma are most likely to have suffered the loss of a father; (ii) those with direct experience or trauma are also most likely to have migrated during the civil war; (iii) those born close to Liberia – where fighting first erupted but then moved towards interior Chiefdoms – are more likely to be socialized or face a background narrative; (iv) being part of a ruling family does not strongly correlate to one type of experience more than another, in line with the earlier finding that such characteristics do not predict exposure to conflict or victimization.

same as never experiencing civil war altogether. Such counterfactuals simply do not exist in this context.

Panel B of Table 6 focuses on the geo-coded measure of exposure to conflict, the advantage of which is that it can be measured for each experience. By definition, those subject to the background narrative are never exposed to conflict. Comparing those with direct experience to those traumatized, the latter are exposed to a significantly higher number of violent events ($p = .027$), especially events where civilians were targeted by government forces ($p = .000$). The groups do not differ by the total number of casualties or civilian casualties in violent events they were exposed to. As might be expected, those traumatized have been exposed to significantly more years of conflict overall ($p = .032$), and were younger at first exposure ($p = .000$). The final Column shows these patterns remains largely robust to conditioning on a polynomial in age and district of birth fixed effects.

Panel C focuses on recalling victimization. By construction, those with the background narrative recall the conflict and report no victimization. Those with trauma or parental trauma have missing data on victimization either because they do not recall the conflict, or they do recall the conflict but report not being victimized. Hence in our typology, victimization data is only available for those socialized or those with direct experience. Comparing victimization accounts between these two groups, those with direct experience report higher rates of nearly each form of victimization than those socialized. The final Column shows that once we condition on age and district of birth fixed effects, those with direct experience are more likely to be internally displaced ($p = .017$), while those socialized are significantly more likely to be a refugee overseas ($p = .048$).

7.3 Experiences of Conflict and Self-Efficacy

We document how experiences of conflict partially correlate to the index of self-efficacy. The omitted experience category are those socialized because: (i) there is an existing body of work emphasizing how socialization during childhood can affect attitudes later in life – that could be due either due to parental selection, or the fact that narratives are passed on without direct experience of violence; (ii) to ease exposition, as their self-efficacy is lowest among all experiences.

Experiences of conflict matter for self-efficacy more than a decade later: Column 1 of Table 7 shows that two of the five experiences (parental protection/trauma and direct experience) generate significantly higher self-efficacy among individuals relative to those socialized, and as shown at the foot of the table, other pairwise comparisons of experiences have significantly different associations with self-efficacy.

Those with parental protection/trauma have the highest levels of self-efficacy relative to the omitted group – the magnitude of the effect is $.194\sigma$ and is statistically significant at the 1% level. The next most impacted group is those with direct experience of conflict, who also have significantly higher self-efficacy than those socialized. The magnitude of the effect is $.164\sigma$ and is significant at the 1% level. These respondents are subject to violence after age 3 when memories are being formed, and these shape later life beliefs that define their self-efficacy.

For other experiences, we cannot rule out that self-efficacy is the same between those with the background narrative and those whose parents are protective/traumatized ($p = .121$). Recall respondents with parental protection/trauma are similar to those with a background narrative except they were exposed to violent events when aged 0 to 2 – yet narratives of these events have not been passed onto them by their parents or others. This implies narratives passed onto children about the civil war might not differ so substantially between those families for which violent events occurred in different locations to their own Chiefdom of residence, and those families for whom violent events occurred in their Chiefdom of residence but prior to their children forming direct memories of those events.

We cannot reject that those traumatized have the same level of self-efficacy as those with the background narrative. These two groups of respondent have no recall of conflict and would typically be bundled together in victimization-based measures of exposure to conflict. As they end up with similar levels of self-efficacy, our results confirm such bundling does not skew any estimated relationship between exposure to conflict and trust operating through self-efficacy.

Finally, we note that those with trauma – who were also exposed to violence after age 3 – have significantly lower levels of self-efficacy than those with direct experience ($p = .084$). This difference in long-term self-efficacy between those with direct experience and those traumatized – whose memories of conflict are more likely to be suppressed – emphasizes the importance of memory and recall in understanding the link between conflict and trust.

Figure 6 summarizes results when repeating the exercise separately for each dimension of self-efficacy. Those with parental protection/trauma have the most diverse increases in self-efficacy: relative to those socialized, they significantly increase in all dimensions of self-efficacy, including in those dimensions most associated with conflict and trust preferences: future planning, and drive, grit and leadership. The same is true for the group with the second highest increase in self-efficacy: those with direct experience of conflict. In contrast, for other experiences, the increase in self-efficacy is driven by: (i) an increase in their locus of control for those with the background narrative; (ii) and increase in their future planning for those with trauma. Consistent with the earlier results using only variation induced by exposure to conflict (Figure 2), we do not find strong evidence that most experiences of conflict generate increases in self-efficacy through improved entrepreneurial skills.

7.4 Measurement Error in Experiences

In the Appendix we discuss measurement error in our classification of experiences of conflict (Table A16). This can arise from the three sources: (i) measurement error in the timing of displacement recorded in migration journals; (ii) measurement error in the location of residence recorded in migration journals; (iii) biased recollection of victimization. We describe evidence to alleviate each concern, discussing cases where measurement error is classical, and to examine concerns

over non-classical measurement error, we make further assumptions about the specific patterns of misclassification. As set out in Figure 5, we do not utilize information on victimization type when constructing experiences (only whether an individual reports being victimized or not). However, using this additional information can help refine the intuition of what each experience is intended to capture. As a final step in the Appendix, we re-consider the use of the exact type of victimization recalled in constructing experiences. We discuss potential ways of reclassifying experiences using this approach. In all cases we continue to find robust evidence that distinct experiences of conflict have significantly different associations with self-efficacy measured 14 years later.

8 Discussion

8.1 External Validity

We do not claim that all conflicts lead individuals to have greater self-efficacy, nor that exposure to conflict always leads to greater conditional trust. Rather, our framework and results make precise how the link between conflict and trust can vary across conflicts. Our analysis allows us to focus on three dimensions in particular.

First, the Sierra Leonean civil war is a conflict that did not occur along ethnic, religious or political divides. It is thus not surprising that our evidence rules out that the link between conflict and trust is driven by an increase in parochial norms (Figure 3). In other conflicts driven along societal divides, exposure to violence might well strengthen social preferences towards ingroups. If so, the model suggests the link between conflict and conditional trust could strengthen or weaken depending on the likelihood of matching with an ingroup member, and the increased strength of ingroup cooperation caused by conflict.

Second, our results linking experiences and self-efficacy suggest differing psychological legacies of conflict – between those who suppress memories of conflict, those with direct first hand accounts of conflict, and those whose narrative of conflict are more likely to be second-hand. Hence, the relationship between conflict and trust preferences will differ across conflicts where different psychological legacies occur – exactly how $\lambda(.)$ is shifted by exposure to and experiences of conflict, the ability to recall victimization, and the age of exposure of civilians.

Finally, the civil war in Sierra Leone was one in which casualty/injury rates were relatively low (estimated to be 1.5% of the population), but there were very high rates of displacement of civilians (it is estimated that 58% of the population were displaced). We can dig into the issue further by examining how specific forms of victimization correlate to self-efficacy. The results are in Column 2 of Table 7 based on the sample that report either being victimized, or those that recall conflict but report not being victimized (the omitted group). Individuals that report their family being harmed or being a refugee overseas have significantly higher self-efficacy. Notably, reporting being personally harmed significantly *reduces* self-efficacy relative to those whose family

was harmed ($p = .013$) or were refugees overseas ($p = .025$). This was masked in the earlier analysis because the most common forms of victimization (fighting in the area, family being harmed or being internally displaced) all positively correlate to self-efficacy, while only 6% of respondents report being personally harmed.[24]

The results point to another source of variation causing the link between exposure to conflict and trust to vary across conflicts: different types of victimization shift self-efficacy in different directions. To the extent that conflicts vary in terms of the *specific* types of victimization civilians suffer, our findings suggest the impact of conflict on trust via self-efficacy will differ. In conflicts where civilians are more likely to be personally harmed, such as the Rwandan civil war, self-efficacy could fall and hence conditional trust could be lower post-conflict.

In the Appendix we further examine two other issues related to external validity: (i) whether our data can be reconciled with an important literature documenting *negative* impacts of conflict on psychological traits (Table A17); (ii) how, in common with the literature on the long-term impacts of conflicts, survivor bias shapes our findings. We emphasize that our sample differs from earlier work in that it is based on a group born into conflict and that survive 14 years post-conflict, and the evidence presented on how specific experiences of conflict differentially correlate to self-efficacy suggest nuanced and heterogeneous ways in how conflict survivors develop psychological hardiness through higher self-efficacy.

8.2 Future Agenda

Exposure to armed conflict in early life is an extremely traumatic experience, affecting 400 million children worldwide, and with the number of countries experiencing armed conflict in 2021 being among the highest in 30 years [Ostby *et al.* 2020]. We shed new light on psychological legacies of conflict, highlighting the role that self-efficacy plays in the long-term formation of trust preferences. The macro evidence suggests post-conflict periods are often characterized by rapid economic recovery [Cerra and Saxena 2008, Miguel and Roland 2011]. Whether psychological legacies of violence help or hinder post-conflict recovery has been subject to debate [Knack and Keefer 1997, Guiso *et al.* 2009]. Our model and evidence help point to ways to move forward this debate by providing insights on how the relationship between conflict and trust varies by the nature of conflicts. Despite the collective trauma, Sierra Leone has seen a remarkable period of post-conflict recovery and stability– at least until the Ebola outbreak of 2014. Linking psychological legacies of conflict to understanding whether such changes in self-efficacy and trust also help foster public goods provision or allow new forms of social organization to emerge [Bowles 2008, Blattman and

[24]The sample includes only those that answered all the victimization questions with *yes* or *no*. Those that answered *don't know* to at least one victimization question are excluded. The different victimization types are not correlated with each other: the highest partial correlation is between reporting fighting in the area and being internally displaced ($\rho = .51$). As is intuitive, the only negative correlation is between being internally displaced and a refugee overseas.

Miguel 2010] would be a natural next step in understanding more general patterns of post-war economic recovery in an increasingly violent world.

Our analysis opens the way to two further directions for future research. First, the framework presented can be developed further to incorporate microfoundations linking experiences of conflict to the generation of self-efficacy. Our evidence suggests that direct exposure to conflict, memories of conflict and narratives/socialization related to conflict each distinctively shape self-efficacy. Natural areas of work to appeal to for future refinements of the model include those studying memory [Bordalo *et al.* 2020], the role of post-traumatic growth in mediating any relationship between exposure to conflict and self-efficacy [Tedeschi *et al.* 1998, Tedeschi and Calhoun 2004, Calhoun and Tedeschi 2006, Betancourt and Khan 2008], and processes of socialization through the intergenerational transmission of narratives and preferences [Dohmen *et al.* 2012, Doepke and Zilibotti 2017, Kosse *et al.* 2020, Chowdhury *et al.* 2022]. The insights developed go beyond psychological legacies mediating the relation between conflict and trust. They can be tailored and applied to other contexts studying economic behavioral responses to traumatic life events across the life cycle, such as job loss, parental loss, and violent crime for example.

Second, there can be gains from integrating work on psychological legacies of conflict with the established literature on human development in early childhood. While this literature has focused on development early in life in response to resource inputs, information and parenting, less attention has been paid to the development of traits such as self-efficacy, or the importance of traumatic shocks in shaping parent-child interactions and human development. Moreover, age of exposure is critical for experiences of conflict. We considered an age split focused on when individuals are more or less capable of retaining first-hand memories of conflict. However there might be other critical periods of childhood when exposure to conflict leaves psychological legacies [Kim and Lee 2014]. Understanding how conflict shapes which traits are formed across phases of development is another rich area for future study.

A Appendix

A.1 Robustness

We present a series of robustness checks on the main finding linking exposure to conflict and trust. Table A9 shows the result is robust to: (i) alternative clustering of standard errors, such as clustering by district of birth, by age, or allowing for robust standard errors (Columns 1a-1c); (ii) using probit or linear probability specifications (where we group the yes and no trust answers together). In both alternative models we find comparable increases in the likelihood to report conditional trust among those ever in the vicinity of conflict (Columns 2, 3).

Given the sensitive nature of survey questions related to conflict and trust, we address the concern that results are driven by enumerator style by conditioning on 53 enumerator fixed ef-

fects in the linear probability model specification. Column 4 shows that the coefficient of interest is unchanged and remains precisely estimated and statistically different from zero. Given enumerators typically survey across a handful of villages, this specification is the closest we can get (without losing precision altogether) to documenting within village variation in conditional trust being related to individuals ever being in the vicinity of conflict.

In Table A10 we explore alternative choices of controls in $\mathbf{X}_i$ using LASSO methods. We vary the set of covariates that we consider for selection (including all interactions). We proceed by first selecting covariates using LASSO for a logit specification where the outcome is conditional trust, and then in a second step, using the selected covariates in our standard multinomial logit specification. Table A10 presents three alternative specifications across which we widen the set of covariates considered. In all specifications our main result continues to hold: those exposed to conflict are significantly more likely to report conditional trust, and exposure to conflict significantly lowers levels of outright trust.

We next consider the issue that post conflict efforts to rebuild communities may have been targeted at villages exposed to conflict, and that such activities might directly drive trust preferences. Table A11 shows how our results vary as we incrementally control for the following village level characteristics, proxying post-conflict reconstruction: (i) the presence of infrastructure (market structure, primary school, secondary school, health center, public toilet, communal areas, drying floors); (ii) distance from infrastructure (market structure, primary school, secondary school, health center); (iii) access to and distance from services (telecenter, vocational training center, commercial bank, mobile money agent). Our results remain robust to adding this battery of village-level controls.

We next account for individuals being affected by conflict in neighboring Chiefdoms (that might otherwise lead to measurement error of being in the vicinity of conflict). We construct a measure of conflict exposure that takes into account all episodes of violence that took place within a fixed radius from each Chiefdom's centroid, and weight episodes by the inverse of their distance. We thus redefine exposure to conflict as:

$$C_i = log\left(\sum_t \sum_{e \in E_t} (1 + distance_{i,t,e})^{-1}\right), \tag{5}$$

where t includes years between birth of respondent i and 2001, E_t is the subset of episodes of violence that took place in year t, and $distance_{i,t,e}$ is the distance in kilometers between the centroid of the Chiefdom of residence of respondent i in year t and the location of conflict episode e. Table A12 shows results from our benchmark specification using this measure, for various distance cutoffs, where we note the average Chiefdom has a radius of 12km. As expected, using areas larger than Chiefdom boundaries gradually weakens the results, reinforcing the idea that exposure to localized violence matters for the long-term formation of trust preferences.

We next examine whether the results reflect indecisiveness more generally among those exposed to conflict. To do so we consider responses to an altogether different survey module, on various dimensions of life satisfaction. These questions asked, *"How do you feel about [category]?"* where the categories were own education, family, friends, job, income, own dwelling, own school, own community, future prospects, family's financial situation, access to credit, and life as a whole. Responses were coded on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from very happy/optimistic to very sad/pessimistic. The middle of the scale is labelled as neutral. We combine responses across these dimensions and code whether: (i) the respondent gives a neutral reply to any of these dimensions of satisfaction; (ii) the share of dimensions that they give a neutral response to. Columns 1 and 2 in Table A13 show OLS estimates of these outcomes regressed against the geo-coded exposure to conflict measure, controlling for the usual covariates in (3), and allowing standard errors to be clustered by village of residence. Those exposed to conflict are no more likely to report being neutral on any dimension of satisfaction (Column 1) and their share of neutral answers across all dimensions is also uncorrelated to exposure to conflict (Column 2).

Finally, to check whether our main finding might reflect those exposed to conflict having smaller social networks and so are more uncertain of the trustworthiness of others for anonymized exchange, we use social networks data collected in our midline survey from a random subset of 2600 respondents. We report Tobit estimates of the relationship between conflict exposure and the degree of various types of social networks of respondents. These networks include friendship ties, others they speak to about intimate topics, work issues and opportunities, or issues related to finances and credit. As reported in Columns 3 to 6 of Table A13, on each type of social network, we see no relationship between the size of networks reported and having been exposed to conflict.

A.2 Causality

We use three strategies to underpin the link between exposure to conflict early in life and trust preferences expressed a decade later as being causal.

First, we note that variation in the geo-coded exposure to conflict C_i arises from three sources: (i) year of birth; (ii) Chiefdom of birth; (iii) migration during or post-conflict. In Table A14 we explore how the relationship between conflict and trust varies along these dimensions. We do so using a linear probability specification, in which heterogeneous effects of conflict on trust are most transparently estimated. In Column 1 we drop those born in the final year of conflict. This cohort are born to parents who would be more certain of the conflict's end than those born earlier, and they might also be born to parents who strategically delay fertility during the conflict. Either form of selection could correlate with trust preferences. We find the relationship between exposure to conflict and conditional trust remain unchanged when dropping this cohort from the sample: despite the 15% reduction in sample size, the coefficient of interest remains nearly identical (.073) and its standard error increases only marginally.

Column 2 explores how the relationship between conflict and trust varies with location of birth. Those born into districts neighboring Liberia – that experienced the earliest and severest conflict – have no differential relationship between exposure to conflict and conditional trust.

If migration is endogenous to conflict, the results capture a total effect accounting for migratory insurance responses of households. While policy relevant, the concern is that we pick up factors driving both the decision to migrate during conflict and the formation of trust preferences. To assess endogenous migration choices driving exposure to conflict, we examine if there is a heterogeneous relationship between vicinity to conflict and conditional trust between those that did and did not migrate across Chiefdoms during the civil war. We find no evidence for this (Column 3). The same holds if we also allow the relationship between conflict and trust to vary with whether the respondent migrated post-conflict (Column 4). Taken together, the evidence suggests if migrating parents differ in attributes, those differences are unrelated to the formation of conditional trust preferences of their children. This check also helps address concerns that respondents might sort into villages based on their trust preferences [Gilligan *et al.* 2013].

Second, we develop a placebo check by adding five years to the actual year of birth of each respondent (where we restrict the sample to those that would still then be born sometime during the conflict – this avoids a mass of respondents being shifted to never exposed). Columns 1a-1c in Table A15 show that under this placebo, we find no evidence that measured exposure to conflict relates to trust preferences. This placebo strengthens the argument that actual exposure to violence matters, not other geographic factors correlated with conflict.

Finally, we consider an IV approach where we predict exposure to conflict exploiting the geographic and temporal patterns of the conflict spread. We consider as instruments *interactions* between: (i) the distance from a respondents' place of birth and the first recorded episode of violent conflict in 1991 ($DistFV_i$); (ii) the respondent's year of birth. The first stage is:

$$C_i = \sum_{t=1991}^{2000} \delta_t DistFV_i \mathbb{I}[t \geq YoB_i] + X_i\gamma_C + u_i, \tag{6}$$

where C_i is the measure of vicinity to conflict, X_i includes our standard set of controls and fixed effects (including district of birth and district of residence), $\delta = (\delta_{1991}, \ldots, \delta_{2000})'$ and γ_C are column vectors of parameters. The exclusion restriction is that conditional on these controls, the *interaction* of year of birth and distance to the first violent event of the conflict predicts exposure to conflict but has no direct effect on the long-term formation of trust preferences. As a second set of instruments we include interactions of respondent's year of birth with their distance from Freetown ($DistFT_i$) so the first stage is:

$$C_i = \sum_{t=1991}^{2000} \delta_t DistFV_i \mathbb{I}[t \geq YoB_i] + \sum_{t=1991}^{2000} \sigma_t DistFT_i \mathbb{I}[t \geq YoB_i] + X_i\gamma_C + u_i. \tag{7}$$

Figure A6 graphs the first stage estimates of the instruments on exposure to conflict. In the left hand panel we see the first stage from (6). Residing further from the first violent event decreases the likelihood of ever being in the vicinity of conflict for those born up until 1997, and the effect of the instruments reverses later in time as the conflict advanced to regions away from the border with Liberia. The right hand panel shows the estimates from the first stage described in (7). Again we see the instruments vary in their predictability with year of birth of ever being in the vicinity of conflict.

Columns 2 and 3 in Table A15 report the second stage 2SLS estimates, where we use a LPM specification for the second stage. For both sets of instruments, we find a strong first stage (F-statistics above 30) and the second stage remains precisely estimated. The magnitude of the IV effects of conflict on conditional trust are stronger than in the baseline LPM specification, being around double in size. The IV estimates imply that ever being in the vicinity of conflict increases the likelihood of reporting conditional trust in others a decade later by around 13.5pp, corresponding to a 27% increase in conditional trust over those never in the vicinity of conflict.

A.3 Measurement Error in Experiences

Timing of Displacement We tackle concerns over measurement error in the timing of displacement using two approaches. First, we reiterate findings from the placebo check reported in Columns 1a to 1c of Table A15 – in which we add five years to the true year of birth of respondents before constructing migration histories, and find no evidence that such measured exposure to conflict relates to trust preferences. Second, we note from Table 7 that those with the experience of parental protection/trauma have significantly higher levels of self-efficacy than those with the trauma experience – where the magnitude of the difference is $.15\sigma$ ($p = .035$). These experiences only differ in the age at which a respondent was exposed to conflict (before or after memory formation). Classical measurement error in the timing of displacement should attenuate any such difference, but we still find significantly different levels of self-efficacy between these groups.

Location We next consider measurement error arising from misrecollection of Chiefdoms of residence, that has two consequences. First, some of those classified with the socialized experience should actually be classified as having the direct experience, because our geo-coded measure places the respondent into a mismeasured Chiefdom (either by placing them in the wrong Chiefdom, or because we miss a migration spell). Second, misclassification should affect the remaining three experience groups: those with parental protection/trauma, those with individual trauma (both reporting no victimization, but geocoded to be in the proximity of conflict at different ages), and those exposed to background narratives (those reporting no victimization, and with no geo-coded exposure to conflict).

Classical measurement error due to poor quality data in the migration journals would attenuate

the differences in self-efficacy between these two sets of experiences, as they report the same level of victimization but differ in the geo-coded measure of exposure. However, Table 7 shows several tests supporting the fact that these two sets of experience have markedly distinct relationships with self-efficacy 14 years later, even in the presence of potential measurement error. For example, the socialized and direct experiences are characterized by very different levels of self-efficacy (indeed, the second largest difference between all experience groups). Moreover, substantial differences in self-efficacy persist also between the parental protection/trauma group and the trauma group.

Recollection of Victimization The third source of measurement error is biased recollection of victimization. We reiterate that age is the predominant predictor of answering the victimization question, while other observables such as parental education or coming from a ruling family do not predict answering such questions, even through those from ruling families are more likely to be exposed to some types of victimization, e.g. refugee status (Table A5).

Other Forms of Mismeasurement To examine forms of non-classical measurement error, we make assumptions about patterns of misclassification. One type of measurement error that could drive our results in Table 7 (not just attenuate them) is if respondents who migrated are more likely to make errors or omissions in their migration journal. As a consequence there would be measurement error in our geo-coded measure of exposure, and the presence of omitted variables determining both self-efficacy and migration would bias our estimates.

To show this is unlikely to be the case, we focus on one group where misclassification is most likely: those classified to be socialized. This group reports some form of victimization, and comprises two forms of geo-coded exposure: not exposed, or exposed before memory formation begins at age 3. If migration journals with more entries generate more measurement error, we should observe different average exposure between the socialized that never migrated (i.e. those with less measurement error) and those that did migrate (those with more measurement error). Instead, we find the share of socialized that were never exposed, as opposed to exposed by age 2, is 54% for both those that did move ($n = 476$) and those that never migrated ($n = 180$). Hence within the socialized group, we do not find that migration frequency generates differences in estimated geo-coded exposure. Similarly, if migration resulted in endogenous measurement error due to poor quality data from migration journals, we expect the potentially misclassified group – those socialized – to report higher rates of migration than the correctly classified group with the same victimization status – those with direct experience. This is not the case: 73% of the socialized have ever migrated, against 70% among those with direct experience.

Another form of measurement error could be that some respondents report victimization, but they omit the location where victimization took place (and all successive migration spells moving to Chiefdoms with active fighting). As a result, for the socialized we observe victimization but we erroneously never place them in the vicinity of conflict. If this were the case, we would expect that,

among all those victimized, the group that is misclassified (socialized) would report on average fewer migration spells than the group that is not misclassified (direct). This is not the case. Those classified with socialized or direct experiences report a similar number of migration spells (1.41 and 1.45 respectively).

Finally, it is possible that victimization affects the quality of migration journals, either directly or through correlated unobservables. An example might be a respondent who has been directly victimized having more/less recollection of the timing of events. If this were the case, the migration data of those with direct and socialized experiences should be equally precise (as both report victimization). To check for this, in Table A16 we re-estimate the specifications relating experiences of conflict to self-efficacy, but limit the sample to those reporting being victimized. As a comparison, Column 1 shows the baseline estimate. Column 2 shows that if we limit the sample to those reporting victimization, the association between the direct experience and self-efficacy remains largely unchanged from our baseline, and the difference between these experiences for self-efficacy remains the same.

Using Types of Victimization to Reclassify Experiences As Figure 5 describes, we do not use information on the type of victimization when constructing experiences (only whether an individual reports being victimized or not). We discuss a number of potential avenues to reclassify experiences using this information.

To begin with, we might be concerned that those we classify as being socialized but that also report being personally harmed are incorrectly classified (Table 6, Panel C). It is natural to then re-classify these (36) respondents into the direct experience group. The result, in Column 3 of Table A16, shows the estimates are unchanged when using this additional information to reclassify experiences. Taking this intuition one step further, we can additionally reclassify those that are socialized but report fighting in their area as being in the direct experience group (508 respondents). The result, in Column 4 of Table A16, shows a reduced magnitude and precision in the estimated effect of the parental protection/trauma experience on self-efficacy from $.19\sigma$ to $.15\sigma$ ($p = .136$). It is not surprising the precision falls because with such a large reclassification, the omitted socialization group includes only those with victimization types of being a refugee, being internally displaced or having family members harmed ($N = 112$). However, it remains the case that experiences matter: we continue to find that experiences of parental protection/trauma have distinct impacts on self-efficacy than the direct ($p = .048$) and the trauma experience ($p = .007$).

Finally, we consider the most extreme reclassification. moving *all* those with the socialized experience into the direct experience, and setting trauma experience as the omitted experience group. The result in Column 5 of Table A16 shows the partial correlation of the parental protection/trauma experience on self-efficacy remains almost unchanged (in magnitude and precision) from our baseline estimate, and other pairwise comparisons across the experience types to continue to show strong evidence that distinct experiences of conflict have significantly different associations

with self-efficacy measured 14 years later.

A.4 Negative Psychological Legacies of Conflict

While the evidence demonstrates the role that increased self-efficacy plays in linking exposure to conflict and trust preferences, it is equally important to understand whether our data can be reconciled with a literature documenting *negative* impacts of conflict on other psychological traits, such as depression and anxiety [Ehlers and Clark 2000, Vinck *et al.* 2007]. We examine the issue by linking exposure to conflict and self-reported measures of anxiety and life satisfaction. We asked respondents about whether they worry about various dimensions of life: finding a job, finding a husband, money and violence/theft. The results in Table A17 show that: (i) relative to those never in the vicinity of conflict, those ever exposed to conflict are significantly more likely to report worrying about violence/theft, but not about other dimensions such a finding a job, a husband or money (Columns 1-4).

Given those exposed to conflict have both higher anxiety and self-efficacy, one way to establish the net effect on welfare is to examine correlations between exposure to conflict and life satisfaction. To be clear, these comparisons are relative to those never exposed to conflict – the results cannot be interpreted as relative to a counterfactual absent civil war. We construct indices across three dimensions: social, economic and life in general. These results are in the remaining Columns of Table A17. We see overall higher satisfaction along two of the three dimensions for those exposed to conflict: social and life in general. This is consistent with any positive effects on self-efficacy induced by exposure to conflict more than compensating for negative impacts through anxiety about future violence.[25]

A.5 Survivor Bias

As in any study on the long-term effects of conflict that generate casualties, our analysis is based on a select sample of survivors. Our sample differs from earlier work in that it is based on a group born into conflict and that survive 14 years post-conflict (Table A1). While this helps answer our main research question, this leads to a potentially more severe form of survivor bias. Earlier studies have demonstrated that children who live through conflict are less healthy, less educated, and have worse labor market outcomes as adults. Our findings complement these to highlight individuals exposed to conflict in early life can develop psychological hardiness in the form of higher self-efficacy.[26]

[25] The satisfaction indices are inverse covariance weighted indices constructed from questions asking respondents to rate their satisfaction on a Likert scale. The dimensions over which this questions are asked are: (i) Social: friends, family, community, house; (ii) Economic: own education, job, earnings, household finances, access to credit; (ii) Life: life as a whole, future prospects. The indices are each standardized relative to the omitted group.

[26] The other dimension of selection is that our sample is based on girls born into conflict. As such, our focus is largely on victims of conflict, and our results do not speak to the formation of trust preferences among perpetrators

However, a chief concern is that of reverse causality, namely that individuals with more self-efficacy are better able to survive conflict. The evidence presented on how specific experiences of conflict differentially correlate to self-efficacy go some way to ameliorating this concern. These experiences are constructed combining data on exposure to conflict and subtle variations in the recall of victimization, and age of geo-coded exposure to conflict. It is hard to give a simple explanation based on reverse causality where those defined with parental protection/trauma are better able to survive the conflict than those socialized for example.

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Table 1: Conditional Trust, Savings and Employment

Columns 1-4, 6-7: Logit estimates, average marginal effects reported
Column 5: OLS estimates
Standard errors clustered by village of residence

	Savings Behavior			Employment			
	Any savings	Any savings, at home	Any savings, ROSCA	Any Income Generating Activity	Income Generating Activity: hours/week	Self-employed	Wage employment
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Trust = YES	.012	.046	-.014	.016	3.89***	.021	-.002
	(.030)	(.030)	(.023)	(.029)	(1.43)	(.031)	(.024)
Trust = It Depends	.068**	.128***	-.017	.050*	5.52***	.084***	-.023
	(.030)	(.028)	(.024)	(.030)	(1.34)	(.029)	(.026)
Trust = NO (excluded category)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
yes = it depends [p-value]	{.011}	{.000}	{.847}	{.084}	{.092}	{.003}	{.224}
Individual controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Village controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
District of birth and of residence FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample Avg	.554	.442	.241	.519	25.2	.381	.239
Observations	3,891	3,891	3,891	3,891	3,891	3,891	3,891

Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Logit specification estimates are reported in all Columns except Column 5 where an OLS specification is utilzied. We report average marginal effects for logit specifications and coefficients' estimates for OLS regressions. All specifications include a cubic polynomial in age, district of birth and district of residence fixed effects. Individual controls include dummy variables for respondents belonging to each of the three largest tribes in our sample (Mende, Temne and Limba); respondents identifying as Muslim; respondents' father has completed junior secondary education; whether father's education is unknown; respondent belongs to a ruling family, and whether the respondent does not know if she belongs to a ruling family. Village controls include the number of households residing in the community and the average PPI score, the latter being an index capturing household wealth. Standard errors are clustered by village of residence. ROSCA stands for rotating savings and credit association, also known in Sierra Leone as OSUSU.

Table 2: Geo-Coded Exposure to Conflict

Means, standard deviation in parentheses

	(1) Working Sample	(2) Migrated During Civil War [1991, 2001]	(3) Stable Residence During Civil War [1991, 2001]	(4) Ruling Family	(5) Non-Ruling Family
Number of respondents	3,891	551	3,340	622	3,168
Exposed to any conflict	.621	.868	.581	.659	.619
Conditional on exposure:					
Exposed to conflict at age zero	.446	.389	.460	.445	.441
Exposed to in Chiefdom of birth	.977	.895	.995	.985	.973
Youngest age when exposed to conflict	1.46	1.50	1.44	1.54	1.45
	(1.89)	(1.86)	(1.90)	(2.03)	(1.86)
Cumulative number of conflict episodes exposed to	10.2	12.8	9.58	10.4	10.2
	(10.7)	(14.33)	(9.45)	(12.5)	(10.3)
Migration during civil war					
Ever migrated	.142	1	0	.169	.139
Number of migrations | migrated	1.16	1.16	-	1.18	1.16
	(.423)	(.423)	-	(.434)	(.422)
Migration post civil war					
Ever migrated	.677	.967	.630	.696	.671
Number of migrations | migrated	1.75	1.41	1.83	1.76	1.75
	(1.01)	(1.19)	(.947)	(1.06)	(1.01)

Notes: Migration is recorded within the survey's migration journal, where respondents are asked to list all locations where they resided for at least six months. In Column 4, a respondent belongs to a ruling family if her household's members are eligible for the role of Paramount Chief (district level) and sub-Chief (chiefdom level). Eligibility for ruling positions is hereditary, and several families can be eligible within a Chiefdom. Respondents who did not know/remeber their family status are excluded from Columns 4 and 5.

Table 3: Exposure to Conflict and Trust

Multinomial logit, average marginal effects reported
Dependent variable: In general do you think people can be trusted?
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by village of residence

	(1a) No	(1b) Conditional Trust	(1c) Yes	(2a) No	(2b) Conditional Trust	(2c) Yes
Exposed to Conflict	-.014	.071***	-.057**	-.017	.076***	-.058**
	(.016)	(.027)	(.028)	(.016)	(.028)	(.028)
p-value (yes = no)		{.236}			{.249}	
Age		✓			✓	
Other individual controls					✓	
Village controls					✓	
District of birth, district of residence fixed effects		✓			✓	
Sample Average | Not exposed to conflict	.118	.504	.378	.118	.504	.378
Observations		3,891			3,891	

Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Average marginal effects from multinomial logit specifications are reported. All specifications include a cubic polynomial in age, district of birth and district of residence fixed effects. In Columns 2a-2c, the other individual controls include dummy variables for respondents belonging to each of the three largest tribes in our sample (Mende, Temne and Limba); respondents identifying as Muslim; respondents' father has completed junior secondary education; whether father's education is unknown; respondent belongs to a ruling family, and whether the respondent does not know if she belongs to a ruling family. Village controls include the number of households residing in the community and the average PPI score, the latter being an index capturing household wealth. Standard errors are clustered by village of residence.

Table 4: Exposure to Localized Conflict and Trust, Non-migrants

Multinomial logit, average marginal effects reported
Dependent variable: In general do you think people can be trusted?
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by village of residence

	(1a) No	(1b) Conditional Trust	(1c) Yes	(2a) No	(2b) Conditional Trust	(2c) Yes
Exposed to Conflict (2KM)	-.074***	.087*	-.014	-.067***	.074	-.007
	(.021)	(.052)	(.053)	(.024)	(.049)	(.051)
p-value (yes = no)		{.335}			{.333}	
Age	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Other individual controls				✓	✓	✓
Village controls				✓	✓	✓
District of birth, district of residence fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample Average | Not exposed to conflict	.121	.449	.430	.121	.449	.430
Observations		1,238			1,238	

Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Average marginal effects for a multinomial logit specification are reported. The measure of exposure to conflict used in this table is a dummy capturing extensive margin exposure to conflict. It is computed as follows. For each village in our sample, we compute the number of episodes of conflict that occurred within a fixed radius of 2km each year. We then compute individual level exposure by cumulating these measures based on respondents' year of birth and current village of residence.That is, a respondent living in Bangro village and born in 1995 is mapped to all episodes of figthing that took place within 2km of Bangro village from 1995 onwards. For respondents who never moved, this measures maps to their individual exposure. For respondents who migrated during their lifetime, this measure maps more closely to the experience of the residents in their host village and might differ from their individual experience of conflict. Individual controls include a cubic polynomial in age, and dummy variables for: respondents belonging to each of the three largest tribes in our sample (Mende, Temne and Limba); respondents identifying as Muslim; respondents' father has completed junior secondary education; whether father's education is unknown; respondent belongs to a ruling family, and whether the respondent does not know if she belongs to a ruling family. Village controls include the number of households residing in the community and the average PPI score, the latter being an index capturing household wealth. We control for district of birth and district of residence fixed effects.

Table 5: Exposure to Conflict, Self-Efficacy and Trust

Multinomial logit, average marginal effects reported
Dependent variable: In general do you think people can be trusted?
Standard errors clustered by village of residence

	(1a) No	(1b) Conditional Trust	(1c) Yes	(2a) No	(2b) Conditional Trust	(c) Yes
Aggregate Self-Efficacy Index	-.002	.053***	-.050***			
	(.006)	(.009)	(.009)			
Components of the Aggregate Self-Efficacy Index:						
Locus of control				.012**	-.005	-.017*
				(.005)	(.009)	(.007)
Drive, Grit and Leadership				-.009	.041***	-.032***
				(.007)	(.014)	(.012)
Enforcement and Persuasion				.019**	.006	-.025*
				(.009)	(.016)	(.015)
Entrepreneurial Skills				-.021**	.008	-.013
				(.009)	(.015)	(.015)
Future Planning				-.012	.035**	-.023*
				(.007)	(.015)	(.008)
Exposed to Conflict	-.017	.072***	-.055**	-.015	.063**	-.048*
	(.016)	(.028)	(.028)	(.016)	(.027)	(.027)
p-value (self efficacy: yes = no)		{.000}				
Individual controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Village controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
District of birth, district of residence fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample Average | Not exposed to conflict	.118	.504	.378	.118	.504	.378
Observations		3,891			3,891	

Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Average marginal effects for a multinomial logit specification are reported. Individual controls include a cubic polynomial in age, and dummy variables for: respondents belonging to each of the three largest tribes in our sample (Mende, Temne and Limba); respondents identifying as Muslim; respondents' father has completed junior secondary education; respondent belongs to a ruling family. We also include dummies for respondents who do not know their father's education or family status. Village controls include the number of households residing in the community and the average PPI score, the latter being an index capturing household wealth. We control for district of birth and district of residence fixed effects. The measure of self-efficacy is an inverse covariance weighted index using the approach set out by Anderson [2008]. This aggregates 21 components across five domains: locus of control (3 components); drive, grit and leadership (4 components); enforcement and persuasion (4 components); entrepreneurial skills (6 components) and future planning (4 components). The index is standardized with respect to the control group (those not exposed to conflict). The reported p-value tests for the equality of marginal effects of the self-efficacy index on not trusting others and trusting others. Standard errors are clustered by village of residence.

Table 6: Experiences of Conflict

Means, p-values in braces

	(1) Socialized	(2) Background Narrative	(3) Direct	(4) Trauma	(5) Parental Protection/Trauma		
Number of observations (%)	656 (16.9%)	1,114 (28.6%)	1,033 (26.6%)	494 (12.7%)	594 (15.3%)		
Panel A. Family Background							
Age	17.6	14.5	21.4	20.2	16.5		
Father died during the civil war	.051	.014	.111	.103	.037		
Mother died during the civil war	.021	.004	.032	.029	.022		
Migrated during civil war	.108	.038	.238	.243	.121		
Born in district close to Liberia	.419	.488	.251	.221	.219		
Ruling family	.193	.141	.170	.139	.185		
						Unconditional	Conditional on a polynomial in age and district of birth
Panel B. Exposed to Conflict						**Direct = Trauma**	**Direct = Trauma**
Total number of events	2.40	0	12.8	13.6	5.43	{.027}	{.130}
Events with civilian targets	1.17	0	6.14	6.81	2.24	{.002}	{.028}
Events with civilians targeted by government	.241	0	1.19	1.57	.545	{.000}	{.169}
Events with civilians targeted by rebels	.905	0	4.91	5.17	1.64	{.153}	{.062}
Total number of casualties	28.1	0	197	205	82.7	{.547}	{.454}
Total number of civilian casualties	11.5	0	60.4	66.4	20.5	{.151}	{.100}
Years of exposure	.733	0	3.48	3.61	1.65	{.032}	{.066}
Age at first exposure	.338	-	2.48	1.48	.209	{.000}	{.000}
Panel C. Victimization Recall						**Socialized = Direct**	**Socialized = Direct**
Fighting in the area	.892	0	.924	-	-	{.017}	{.751}
Personally harmed	.058	0	.089	-	-	{.018}	{.909}
Family harmed	.488	0	.500	-	-	{.603}	{.697}
Internally displaced	.673	0	.785	-	-	{.000}	{.017}
Refugee overseas	.155	0	.134	-	-	{.221}	{.048}

Notes: Panels A and C use information collected from respondents in 2014. Panel B is constructed by matching respondents' migration journals with conflict data from Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). In particular, we map each respondent to all episodes of violence that took place in their chiefdom of residence. For each group, the table reports the average number of episodes of violence respondents were exposed to. The UCDP data contains also information on whether civilians were the target of violence, the identity of the perpetrators, as well as the number of casualties among combatants and civilians. The remainder of panel B summarises this information, averaging the characteristics of the episodes of violence experienced by respondents in each group. The last two columns report tests of equality of means across pairs of experience. The first of set of tests - unconditional – are performed by regressing the variable of interest on dummies for each of the experience groups, and then testing for equality of the relevant coefficients. The second set of tests is analogous, but regressions additionally control for a cubic polynomial in age and district of birth fixed effects.

Table 7: Experiences of Conflict, Victimization and Self-Efficacy

OLS regression estimates
Dependent variable: index of self-efficacy
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by village of residence

	(1) Self-Efficacy	(2) Self-Efficacy
Parental protection/trauma	.194***	
	(.062)	
Direct	.164***	
	(.058)	
Background narrative	.090	
	(.066)	
Trauma	.049	
	(.066)	
Victimized: Fighting in the area		.079
		(.073)
Victimized: Personally harmed		-.098
		(.095)
Victimized: Family harmed		.213***
		(.053)
Victimized: Internally displaced		.087
		(.067)
Victimized: Refugee overseas		.192**
		(.085)
Sample Average | Omitted group (socialized)	0	
Sample Average | Omitted group (not victimized)		0
p-values:		
Parental protection/trauma = Direct	{.683}	
Parental protection/trauma = Background narrative	{.121}	
Parental protection/trauma = Trauma	{.035}	
Direct = Background narrative	{.396}	
Direct = Trauma	{.084}	
Background narrative = Trauma	{.614}	
Personally harmed = Fighting in the area		{.116}
Personally harmed = Family harmed		{.013}
Personally harmed = Internally displaced		{.122}
Personally harmed = Refugee overseas		{.025}
Individual controls	✓	✓
Village controls	✓	✓
District of birth, district of residence fixed effects	✓	✓
Observations	3,891	1,804

Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. OLS estimates are reported. The outcome in both columns is our chosen measure of self-efficacy, an inverse covariance weighted index using the approach set out by Anderson [2008]. This aggregates 21 components across five domains: self-control (3 components); drive, grit and leadership (4 components); enforcement and persuasion (4 components); entrepreneurial skills (6 components) and future planning (4 components). The index is standardized with respect to the control group (those not exposed to conflict, or those not victimized). In Column 2, the sample includes only those 1,804 respondents within the estimation sample who answered all of the victimization questions with either yes or no. Respondents that answered don't know to at least one victimization question are excluded. Individual controls include a cubic polynomial in age, and dummy variables for: respondents belonging to each of the three largest tribes in our sample (Mende, Temne and Limba); respondents identifying as Muslim; respondents' father has completed junior secondary education; respondent belongs to a ruling family. We also include dummies for respondents who do not know their father's education or family status. Village controls include the number of households residing in the community and the average PPI score, the latter being an index capturing household wealth. We control for district of birth and district of residence fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by village of residence.

Figure 1: Framework for Understanding Trust Preferences

A. Gains from Self-Efficacy



B. Equilibrium



C. Comparative Static: Increased Gains from Self Efficacy



D. Comparative Static: Less Extreme Beliefs over Others



Figure 2: Exposure to Conflict and Self-Efficacy, Detail



Notes: The figure shows OLS estimates and 90% confidence interval. These are estimated regressing indices for each sub-dimension of our self-efficacy index, and separately regressing each of their components, on whether the individual was ever exposed to conflict. In each specification we control for a cubic polynomial in age, and dummy variables for: respondents belonging to each of the three largest tribes in our sample (Mende, Temne and Limba); respondents identifying as Muslim; respondents' father has completed junior secondary education; respondent belongs to a ruling family, and separate dummies for whether parental education of family ruling status is unknown. We also include for village controls: the number of households residing in the community and the average PPI score, the latter being an index capturing household wealth. Finally, we control for district of birth and district of residence fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by village of residence. Indices (dark blue) are constructed following Anderson [2008]. Both indices and their components (light blue) are standardized with respect to the excluded group (those not exposed to conflict).

Figure 3: Exposure to Conflict and Trust in Groups



Notes: The figure reports average marginal effects from a multinomial logit specification, with 90% confidence intervals. The outcome variable in each case is the answer to the following question: "How many people in [group] can you trust?". This is coded to take four categorical values: all, most, some, or none. In each specification we control for a cubic polynomial in age, and dummy variables for: respondents belonging to each of the three largest tribes in our sample (Mende, Temne and Limba); respondents identifying as Muslim; respondents' father has completed junior secondary education; respondent belongs to a ruling family. We also include for village controls: the number of households residing in the community and the average PPI score, the latter being an index capturing household wealth. Finally, we control for district of birth and district of residence fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by village of residence.

Figure 4: Victimization

A. Victimization



B. Victimization, by Age at End of Civil War



Notes: Panel A (left) reports sample averages exposure to conflict, recalling wartime experience and victimization. Exposure to conflict is computed by matching self-reported migration journals with conflict data from the UCDP. The match is performed at the Chiefdom-year level. Respondents are identified as recalling their civil war experience if they answered at least one of the questions on victimization, as opposed to answering "don't know/don't remember" to all five questions. The sample shares shown are conditional on vicinity to conflict. The third set of bars shows the share of the sample reporting any form of victimization, conditional on vicinity to conflict and on recalling the civil war. Panel A (right) shows details on the five form of victimization for which data was collected. Sample share are conditional on recalling the civil war. Panel B shows sample shares for the three variables - vicinity, recall, and victimization - conditional on respondent's age in 2001, the year when the last episode of violence took place.

Figure 5: Constructing Experiences of Conflict



Notes: Exposure to conflict is measured using data from migration journals, which record every Chiefdom respondent's lived in for at least six months since birth. A respondent is defined to be exposed to conflict if at least one episode of violence took place in her Chiefdom of residence. Victimization is measured over five dimensions: personal harm, family members being harmed, fighting in the area of residence, being internally displaced, or being a refugee overseas. We asked respondents whether they experienced each form of victimization, and the possible answers were: (i) "did not live in Sierra Leone", (ii) "too young/don't remember", (iii) "no", and (iv) "yes". Respondents are classified as recalling victimization if they answered "yes" to at least one type of victimization. This group is then split into Socialized and Direct Experience based on their exposure to conflict and their age at exposure. All other respondents are classified as not recalling any victimization. They form the Background Narrative, Trauma and Parental Trauma/Protection experience groups based on their exposure to conflict and their age of exposure.

Figure 6: Experiences of Conflict and Self-Efficacy, Detail



Notes: The figure shows OLS estimates and their associated 90% confidence interval, of regressing the index of self-efficacy, or separately regressing each of its sub-dimensions, on a set of dummies for each experience of conflict. In each specification we control for a cubic polynomial in age, and dummy variables for: respondents belonging to each of the three largest tribes in our sample (Mende, Temne and Limba); respondents identifying as Muslim; respondents' father has completed junior secondary education; respondent belongs to a ruling family. We also include for village controls: the number of households residing in the community and the average PPI score, the latter being an index capturing household wealth. Finally, we control for district of birth and district of residence fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by village of residence. Each outcome is an inverse covariance weighted index, standardized with respect to the omitted experience group (those socialized).

Table A1a: Literature Review (studies covered in Bauer *et al*. 2016 meta-analysis)

Paper	Country	Conflict	Sample	Time since war exposure	Age of Exposure	Measure of Exposure
This paper	**Sierra Leone**	**Civil war (1991–2002)**	**~4,000 young women**	**12 years**	**0-9**	**1) Self-reported 2) Geo-reference via migration and conflict data**
Annan, Blattman, Mazurana, and Carlson (2011)	Uganda	Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency (1986–2006)	Representative sample of youth, some of whom were conscripted by LRA; N = 613	~7 years	adolescence, early adulthood (abduction for conscription purpose)	Self-reported abduction by LRA; questions about 17 specific acts of violence, experienced or perpetrated, on self and family
Bauer, Cassar, Chytilová, and Henrich (2014)	Georgia and Sierra Leone	Georgia: war with Russia over South Ossetia (2008) Sierra Leone: civil war (1991–2002)	Georgia: children; N = 565 Sierra Leone: adult population; N = 586	Georgia: 6 months Sierra Leone: 8 years	Georgia: 3-12 Sierra Leone: 0-75	Self-reported victimization and displacement
Bauer, Fiala, and Levely (2014)	Uganda	Lord's Resistance Army insurgency (1986–2006)	Young men, some of whom were conscripted by LRA; N = 337	5 years	Abducted from childhood to later years. 10-50	Self-reported abduction by LRA; questions about 17 specific acts of violence, experienced or perpetrated, on self and family
Bellows and Miguel (2006, 2009)	Sierra Leone	Civil war (1991–2002)	Nationally representative sample; N = 10,496	3–5 years	All adults/no age range information	Self-reported questions used to create a victimization index and number of reported attacks and battles within each chiefdom as another violence measure.
Blattman (2009)	Uganda	Lord's Resistance Army insurgency (1986–2006)	Young men, some of whom were conscripted by LRA; N = 741	~5 years	Abducted from childhood to later years. Mean age of abduction=15 yrs	Self-reported violence related questions
Cassar, Grosjean, and Whitt (2013)	Tajikistan	Civil war (1992–1997)	Adult population; N = 426	13 years	Ages 0-64	Self-reported violence related questions
Cecchi, Leuveld, Voors, and van der Wal (2015)	Sierra Leone	Civil war (1991–2002)	Youth male street football players; N = 162	8 years	Ages 1-23	Self-reported questions used to create a victimization index
De Luca and Verpoorten (2015a)	Uganda	Lord's Resistance Army insurgency (1986–2006)	Nationally representative sample; N = 4,671	12 years	All adults/no age range information	External violent acts reports - ACLED
De Luca and Verpoorten (2015b)	Uganda	Lord's Resistance Army insurgency (1986–2006)	Nationally representative sample; N = 4,671	12 years	All adults/no age range information	External violent acts reports - ACLED
Gilligan, Pasquale, and Samii (2014)	Nepal	Civil war (1996–2006)	Household heads; N = 252	3 years	14-76	Village Development Committees-level fatality figures
Gneezy and Fessler (2012)	Israel	Israel–Hezbollah war (2006)	Senior citizens; N = 50	1 year	Senior citizens that were not called into military service	Experiment before and after war - no spatial conflict data used
Grosjean (2014)	35 countries in Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia	WWII (1939–45); Yugoslav wars (1991–95); Kosovo war (1998–99); Tajik civil war (1992–97); Chechen wars (1994–2009); Kyrgyzstan clashes (2010)	Nationally representative samples; N = 38,864	5 months–65 years	Mostly parent/grandparent exposure	Self-reported survey questions on if you or parents or grandparents were harmed
Grossman, Manekin, and Miodownik (2015)	Israel	Israeli–Palestinian conflict (1967+)	Former soldiers who enlisted between 1998–2003 and 2004–2009; N = 2,334	1–12 years	21-33	Health rankings assigned in the IDF recruitment process as an instrument for combat exposure
Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti (2013)	Uganda	Lord's Resistance Army insurgency (1986–2006)	Nationally representative sample; N = 2,431	8 years	Ages 10-73	Fighting events reported in ACLED
Voors et al. (2012)	Burundi	Civil war (1993–2005)	Household heads, N = 287	4–6 years	Ages 2-85	1) Self-reported community level conflict victimization from village level focus groups 2) self-reported household level conflict questions used for a victimization index
Voors and Bulte (2014)	Burundi	Civil war (1993–2005)	Adult population; N = 874	4 years	14-85	Self-reported questions used to create a victimization index

Table A1b: Literature Review Continued (other studies)

Paper	Country	Conflict	Sample	Time since war exposure	Age of Exposure	Measure of Exposure
This paper	**Sierra Leone**	**Civil war (1991–2002)**	**~4,000 young women**	**12 years**	**0-9**	**1) Self-reported. 2) Geo-reference via migration and conflict data**
Callen et al. (2014)	Afghanistan	Civil war, focus on period between 2002-2010	1127 adults near polling stations	0 years	All adults/no age range information	Incident records of the International Security Assistance Force, a multilateral military body present since December 2001
Hartman and Morse (2008)	Liberia	Civil war (1990-2003)	1280 adults across 64 villages	10 years	15-65	Self-reported violence related questions
Jakiela and Ozier (2019)	Kenya	Post election crisis 2008	N=5049	1 year	13-30	Self-reported violence related questions
Kim and Lee (2014)	Kenya	Kenya war (1950-1953)	N=7047	50 years	0-31	Population data from 1949 census + civilian injuries and casualty data
Moya (2018)	Columbia	Modern conflict in Columbia (1985 - ongoing)	N=284 IDPs	0-10 years (average 2.5 years)	All adults/no age range information	Self-reported violence related questions
Not eligible for met-analysis						
De Juan and Pierskalla (2016)	Nepal	Civil war (1996–2006)	Nationally representative sample; N = 8,822	0–7 years	All adults/no age range information	Number of total killings per VDC. Information is taken from the Informal Sector Services Center (INSEC). Use respondent's GPS info to match with VDCs
Hartman and Morse (2020)	Liberia	Civil war (1989–2003)	Adult population; N ~ 1,600	10 years	All adults/no age range information	Self-reported exposure to violence questions
Shewfelt (2009)	Indonesia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, United States (Vietnam veterans)	Indonesia: insurgency in Aceh (1976–2005) B&H: civil war (1992–1995) United States: Vietnam war (1955–1975)	Indonesia: N = 1,752 Bosnia: nationally representative sample; N = 3,580. United States: male Vietnam theater veterans; N = 1,171	2–11 years		
Other forms of violence						
Bateson (2012)	70 countries	Crime victimization	Latin America: 39,238 United States and Canada: 3,000 Africa: 27,713 Europe: 17,088 Asia: 16,725		All adults/no age range information	Self-reported crime victimization
Becchetti, Conzo, and Romeo (2014)	Kenya	Kenyan crisis, post-election violence (2007–2008)	Nairobi slum-dwellers; N = 404		All adults/no age range information	Self-reported crime victimization, divided into 3 categories: i) direct or indirect harm; ii)economic losses; iii)forced relocation
Hopfensitz and Miquel-Florensa (2014)	Colombia	Colombian conflict (1964+)	Coffee farmers; N = 260		All adults/no age range information	Displacement history. Also linked to average homicide rate over the last 10 years
Rojo-Mendoza (2014)	Mexico	Crime victimization	Nationally representative sample; N = 7,416			

Table A2: Village Descriptives

Means, standard deviation in parentheses

Demographics	
Population	472
	(305)
Household size	5.50
	(1.07)
Employed (share)	.432
	(.079)
Employed | age>17 (share)	.795
	(.098)
Female	.530
	(.038)
Sampling	
Eligible women (number)	75.5
	(57.8)
Eligible women (share)	.159
	(.043)
Sampled women (number)	28.9
	(10.5)
Sampled women (share of those aged 12-25)	.472
	(.164)
Distances to (km)	
District capital	15.2
	(9.82)
Freetown	136
	(63.4)
Market structure	13.5
	(13.1)
Primary school	.638
	(1.29)
Secondary school	6.53
	(7.60)
Health centre	3.01
	(2.81)

Note: Data on village demographics collected during the census of study communities. The Poverty Probability Index (PPI) is a measure designed by IPA to capture household poverty. It ranges from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating a lower pribability of an housheold living below the poverty line. Women are eligible if between 12 and 25 years old in 2014. All distances are in Kilometers.

Table A3: Sample Descriptives

Means, standard deviation in parentheses

Age (years)		17.9
		(3.62)
In a relationship		.628
Ever been pregnant		.517
Has children		.452
Married		.304
Time use (hrs/week)		
Leisure		28.7
		(13.8)
	with friends	6.43
		(4.00)
	with men	5.35
		(5.33)
	alone	5.99
		(4.43)
	volunteer/church	10.9
		(6.34)
Activities		
Work only		.352
School only		.257
Work and school		.167
Home production		.224
Time use (hrs/week)		
Schooling		26.9
		(33.1)
Income generating activities		25.2
		(25.3)
Income Generating Activities		
Wage work		.239
Self-employed		.381
Conditional on working:		
Petty trade		.694
Manufacturing		.170
Agriculture		.168
Work at home/own land		.343
Family business		.362

Notes: Data from baseline survey collected in 2014. As respondents might engage in multiple income generating activities, the share of women employed in each sector will not add to one. A respondent works for a family business if a relative is her employer, or if she identifies as self-employed and employs a relative.

Table A4: Attrition

Dependent Variable = 1 if respondent is tracked 2014-16
OLS estimates, standard errors in parentheses

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Trust: No	-.015	-.018	
	(.017)	(.017)	
Trust: It depends	.012	.006	
	(.011)	(.012)	
Does not recall			-.006
			(.012)
Individual controls	No	Yes	Yes
Tribe and religion	No	Yes	Yes
Village controls	No	Yes	Yes
F-tests: p-values on joint significance:			
Individual controls		{.055}	{.061}
Tribe and religion		{.000}	{.000}
Village controls		{.008}	{.009}
Mean of outcome variable	.838	.838	.838
Observations	5,376	4,979	4,979

Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The outcome in all columns is a dummy equal to one if the respondent not tracked to from the baseline survey in 2014 to the survey in 2016. In each specification we control for a cubic polynomial in age, and dummy variables for: respondents belonging to each of the three largest tribes in our sample (Mende, Temne and Limba); respondents identifying as Muslim; respondents' father has completed junior secondary education; respondent belongs to a ruling family. We also include for village controls: the number of households residing in the community and the average PPI score, the latter being an index capturing household wealth. Finally, we control for district of birth and district of residence fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by village of residence.

Table A5: Correlates of Exposure to Conflict and Victimization

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by village of residence

	Panel A: Geo-Matched Exposure				Panel B: Self-Reported Victimization						
Outcome:	**Conflict Exposure (any)**	**Exposure Intensity (Tobit)**	**Conflict Exposure (any)**	**Exposure Intensity (Tobit)**	**Recall**	**Any Victimization**	**Personally Harmed**	**Family Harmed**	**Refugee**	**Internally Displaced**	**Fighting in the area**
Sample:	**Full**		**Victimization**		**Full**	**Victimization**					
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**	**(6)**	**(7)**	**(8)**	**(9)**	**(10)**	**(11)**
Age (AME)	.111***	3.90***	.075***	2.81***	.044***	.049***	.003	.032***	-.003	.044***	.044***
	(.004)	(.250)	(.005)	(.251)	(.005)	(.005)	(.003)	(.007)	(.003)	(.006)	(.006)
Father's H-Education	-.011	-.015	-.009	-.086	.004	.018	.013	-.029	.029	-.019	-.002
	(.020)	(.591)	(.030)	(.809)	(.027)	(.030)	(.020)	(.039)	(.025)	(.037)	(.032)
Ruling Family	-.002	-.248	-.017	-.960	.006	.023	.026	.026	.047**	-.018	.019
	(.016)	(.603)	(.021)	(.725)	(.019)	(.020)	(.017)	(.029)	(.022)	(.029)	(.025)
F-tests: p-values on joint significance											
Parental characteristics	{.962}	{.903}	{.808}	{.420}	{.755}	{.891}	{.590}	{.264}	{.592}	{.996}	{.625}
Tribe	{.001}	{.000}	{.000}	{.000}	{.019}	{.386}	{.501}	{.565}	{.000}	{.000}	{.110}
Religion	{.295}	{.771}	{.698}	{.804}	{.482}	{.550}	{.737}	{.100}	{.075}	{.107}	{.208}
District of birth FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
District of residence FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample Mean	.622	6.37	.730	8.10	.456	.799	.062	.406	.115	.618	.765
Observations	3,891	3,891	2,115	2,115	3,891	2,115	2,001	1,995	1,983	1,949	1,920

Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Panel A is based on the geo-coded measures of exposure to conflict. Columns 3 and 4 uses the subsample of respondents who completed the victimization module. All specifications are estimated using OLS except those in Columns 2 and 4: they relate to the intensive margin of the total number of episodes of conflict exposed to and thus are estimated using a Tobit specification. Panel B focuses on self-reported vicitmisation. The outcome variable in column 5 is a dummy equal to one for respondents who answered don't know/remember to every victimisation question. In column 6, the outcome variable is a dummy equal to one if the respondent reports any forms of victimisation, conditional on having answered at least one of the five victimisation question. Columns 6 through 11 look at binary indicators for each form of victimisation. In each column we exclude respondents that answered don't know/remember to each question. In each specification we control for a cubic polynomial in age, and dummy variables for: respondents belonging to each of the three largest tribes in our sample (Mende, Temne and Limba); respondents identifying as Muslim; respondents' father has completed junior secondary education; respondent belongs to a ruling family; two dummies equal to one for respondents who do not know/remember their father's education or family status respectively. We also include for village controls: the number of households residing in the community and the average PPI score, the latter being an index capturing household wealth. Finally, we control for district of birth and district of residence fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by village of residence. For the age control we report the average marginal effect estimated from the cubic polynomial.

Table A6: Intensive Margin of the Geo-coded Vicinity to Conflict and Trust

Multinomial logit, average marginal effects reported
Dependent variable: In general do you think people can be trusted?
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by village of residence

	(1a) No	(1b) Conditional Trust	(1c) Yes	(2a) No	(2b) Conditional Trust	(2c) Yes
Exposed to Conflict, intensive	-.006	.021**	-.015			
(Number of episodes, asinh transf.)	(.006)	(.010)	(.010)			
Exposed to Conflict, intensive				-.006**	.011**	-.005
(Number of casualties, asinh transf.)				(.003)	(.005)	(.005)
p-value (yes = no)		{.442}			{.886}	
Age	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Individual controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Village controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
District of birth and district of residence FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample Average | Not exposed to conflict	.118	.504	.378	.118	.504	.378
Observations		3,891			3,891	

Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Average marginal effects for a multinomial logit specification are reported. Columns 1a-1c use the total number of episodes of violence experienced during the war, while Columns 2a-2c use the total number of deaths that took place in each respondent's Chiefdom(s) of residence. Given the large mass at zero and the long tail for each of the two variables, we employ inverse hyperbolic sine transformations. The estimation sample includes only those respondents that have fully completed their migration diaries without error. We lose 267 observations because of minor inconsistencies in their migration journals that do not allow a complete characterization of their conflict experience beyond their extensive margin exposure. Individual controls include a cubic polynomial in age, and dummy variables for: respondents belonging to each of the three largest tribes in our sample (Mende, Temne and Limba); respondents identifying as Muslim; respondents' father has completed junior secondary education; respondent belongs to a ruling family. Village controls include the number of households residing in the community and the average PPI score, the latter being an index capturing household wealth. We control for district of birth and district of residence fixed effects. The reported p-value tests for the equality of marginal effects of the intensive margin exposure measure on not trusting others and trusting others. Standard errors are clustered by village of residence.

Table A7: Exposure to Conflict, Trust and the Costs of Cooperation

Multinomial logit, average marginal effects reported
Dependent variable: In general do you think people can be trusted?
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by village of residence

	(1a) No	(1b) Conditional Trust	(1c) Yes	(2a) No	(2b) Conditional Trust	(2c) Yes
Exposed to Conflict	-.014	.075**	-.058**			
	(.016)	(.028)	(.028)			
Dissatisfied with own community (proxy for k)	.049***	-.081**	.032	.049***	-.082**	.032
	(.018)	(.034)	(.033)	(.018)	(.034)	(.033)
Age	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Other individual controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Village controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
District of birth, district of residence fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample Average | Not exposed to conflict	.118	.504	.378	.118	.504	.378
Observations		3,891			3,891	

Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Average marginal effects for a multinomial logit specification are reported. The measure of dissatisfaction with own community is a dummy equal to one if the respondent selected one of the three negative answers when asked to report satisfaction with own community on a 7-points scale. All specifications include a cubic polynomial in age, district of birth and district of residence fixed effects. The other individual controls include dummy variables for respondents belonging to each of the three largest tribes in our sample (Mende, Temne and Limba); respondents identifying as Muslim; respondents' father has completed junior secondary education; respondent belongs to a ruling family. Village controls include the number of households residing in the community and the average PPI score, the latter being an index capturing household wealth. Standard errors are clustered by village of residence.

Table A8: Exposure to Localized Conflict and Trust, Migrants

Multinomial logit, average marginal effects reported
Dependent variable: In general do you think people can be trusted?
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by village of residence

	(1a) No	(1b) Conditional Trust	(1c) Yes	(2a) No	(2b) Conditional Trust	(2c) Yes
Exposed to Conflict (2KM)	-.004	-.008	.012	.003	.000	-.003
	(.018)	(.033)	(.033)	(.019)	(.031)	(.030)
p-value (yes = no)		{.683}			{.880}	
Age	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Other individual controls				✓	✓	✓
Village controls				✓	✓	✓
District of birth, district of residence FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample Average | Not exposed to conflict	.112	.542	.345	.112	.542	.345
Observations		2,653			2,653	

Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Average marginal effects for a multinomial logit specification are reported. The regressor of interest is a dummy capturing extensive margin exposure to conflict. It is computed as follows. For each village in our sample, we compute the number of episodes of conflict that occurred within a fixed radius of 2km each year. We then compute individual level exposure by cumulating these measures based on respondents' year of birth and current village of residence.That is, a respondent living in Bangro village and born in 1995 is mapped to all episodes of figthing that took place within 2km of Bangro village from 1995 onwards. For respondents who never moved, this measures maps to their individual exposure. For respondents who migrated during their lifetime, this measure maps more closely to the experience of the residents in their host village and might differ from their individual experience of conflict. Individual controls include a cubic polynomial in age, and dummy variables for: respondents belonging to each of the three largest tribes in our sample (Mende, Temne and Limba); respondents identifying as Muslim; respondents' father has completed junior secondary education; whether father's education is unknown; respondent belongs to a ruling family. Village controls include the number of households residing in the community and the average PPI score, the latter being an index capturing household wealth. We control for district of birth and district of residence fixed effects.

Table A9: Robustness

Dependent variable: In general do you think people can be trusted?
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by village of residence

	Multinomial Logit, AME			Probit, AME	LPM	
	(1a) No	(1b) Conditional Trust	(1c) Yes	(2) Conditional Trust	(3) Conditional Trust	(4) Conditional Trust
Exposed to Conflict	-.018	.076***	-.058**	.075***	.075***	.049***
	(.016)	(.028)	(.028)	(.028)	(.029)	(.017)
Alternative clustering of standard errors:						
district of birth	(.019)	(.033)	(.035)			
	{.353}	{.020}	{.094}			
age	(.017)	(.026)	(.023)			
	{.282}	{.008}	{.037}			
robust	(.016)	(.023)	(.022)			
	{.266}	{.001}	{.007}			
Age	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Individual controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Village controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
District of birth, district of residence FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Enumerator fixed effects						✓
Sample Average | Not exposed to conflict	.118	.504	.378	.496	.496	.496
Observations		3,891		3,891	3,891	3,891

Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. In Columns 1a-1c average marginal effects for a multinomial logit specification are reported. Columns 1a-1c report standard errors allowing for alternative clustering. Individual controls include a cubic polynomial in age, and dummy variables for: respondents belonging to each of the three largest tribes in our sample (Mende, Temne and Limba); respondents identifying as Muslim; respondents' father has completed junior secondary education; respondent belongs to a ruling family. Village controls include the number of households residing in the community and the average PPI score, the latter being an index capturing household wealth. We control for district of birth and district of residence fixed effects. Column 4 additionally controls for enumerator fixed effects.

Table A10: Model Selection

Multinomial logit, average marginal effects reported
Dependent variable: In general do you think people can be trusted?
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by village of residence

		(1a) No	(1b) Conditional Trust	(1c) Yes	(2a) No	(2b) Conditional Trust	(2c) Yes	(3a) No	(3b) Conditional Trust	(3c) Yes
Exposed to Conflict		-.019	.072***	-.053**	.013	.052**	-.055*	.005	.039**	-.044***
		(.014)	(.023)	(.024)	(.012)	(.019)	(.020)	(.012)	(.015)	(.017)
Controls:										
LASSO	**Age**		✓			✓			✓	
	District of birth, district of residence FE		✓			✓			✓	
	Parents		✓			✓			✓	
	Individual					✓			✓	
	Village					✓			✓	
	Household								✓	
	Geography								✓	
	Self-efficacy								✓	
Sample Average | Not exposed to conflict		.118	.504	.378	.118	.504	.378	.118	.504	.378
Observations			3,981			3,981			3,981	

Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Average marginal effects for a multinomial logit specification are reported. All specifications include a cubic polynomial in age, district of birth and district of residence fixed effects. In Columns 2a-2c, the other individual controls include dummy variables for respondents belonging to each of the three largest tribes in our sample (Mende, Temne and Limba); respondents identifying as Muslim; respondents' father has completed junior secondary education; respondent belongs to a ruling family. Village controls include the number of households residing in the community and the average PPI score, the latter being an index capturing household wealth. Standard errors are clustered by village of residence. Controls are selected via LASSO, with cross-validated penalty parameter, from the following sets: The age set includes age, age squared, and age cubed. The parents set includes dummies for whether each parent has no education, some education or has completed junior secondary school, together with two dummies equal to one if the respondent does not know the school attainment of each parent. This set also includes dummies for whether each parent has deceead, and further whether they passed away during the period 1991-2001. We also include dummies for each religion, tribe, and for ruling families (those that can run for Chief positions). The individual group includes binary indicators for whether the respondent: is illiterate, has ever attended school, the full set of interactions between attending school and participating in income generating activities (IGA), engaging in IGA interacted with an indicator for respondents being self-employed, is married, is in any form of relationship, is in a relationship characterized by intimate partner violence, has ever had sex, has ever been pregnant, has performed transactional sex in the last year, has endured unwanted sex in the past year. This groups also includes continuous measures for the number of children and pregnancies, as well as measures of HIV knowledge, pregnancy knowledge, financial literacy and cognitive ability (the first three are the share of correct questions to a set of questions on each topic, the latter is the share of correct answers to a battery of Raven matrices). The village category includes binary variables indicating whether the village of residence has: each of 5 sources of water, telecentre, village barray, primary school, vocational training center, health center, community bank, drying floor. We also include dummies for whether, in the past 15 years, the village has experienced: fire, flood, drought, decreased access to drinking water, famine, crop pest, livestock disease, death of a prominent community figure, permanent closure of a school, large employer or vocational training center. We also include dummies for whether the village is the residence of the Paramount or Section Chief, as well as dummies for whether the major employer in town is a private firm, a public organization, an NGO, or no such organizations exist. In addition to dummies indicating whether any NGO or social groups operate from the village, we also include dummies for each of 9 types of NGOs (e.g. microfinance or health service providers) and 10 social groups (e.g. cultural groups, ROSCAs or sport clubs). In terms of continuous measures, we include distances from Freetown, the respective district capitals, the closest market, Primary Health Unit, and primary school - both in absolute value and as asinh transform. The household set includes household size and a wealth index corresponding to the first principal component from a vector of asset ownership questions (homestead land (acres), farmland (acres), cattle, sheep, chicken, plough, shop front, radio, Tv, electric fans, fridge, mobile phone, sofa, iron, bicycles, motorbikes, mosquito nets, generators, sewing machines). The geography group includes a full set of dummies for chiefdom of birth and residence, community of residence, and the enumerator administering the survey. We perform model selection on a logit model with conditional trust as the outcome, and then re-estimate our multinomial logit specification using the controls selected via cross-validation. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. The self-efficacy set includes the measure of self-efficacy described in Section 6, together with inverse-covariance weighted indices for each of the 5 groups of traits we have measures for (future planning; drive, grit and leadership; enforcement and persuasion; locus of control; entrepreneurial skills). The results in Columns 3a-3c rely on 49 controls selected via LASSO. These are an index for enforcement and persuasion related personality traits, dummies for maternal education (high, no education, not known), whether the respondent has ever attended school, whether she is married, whether she refused to answer questions about her sexual activity, and whether she has experience unwanted sexual encounters. The procedure also selected dummies indicating that the village has recently experienced a drought and/or a crop pest, whether the paramount chief resides in the village; whether the village has NGOs providing either microfinance, adolescents' health interventions or "other" services; whether the village has either organized cultural groups or labor groups; fixed effects for two chiefdoms of birth, five chiefdoms of residence and two districts of residence. The procedure also selected fixed effects for 20 out of the 52 enumerators.

Table A11: Robustness to Village Characteristics

Multinomial logit, average marginal effects reported
Dependent variable: In general do you think people can be trusted?
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by village of residence

	(1a) No	(1b) Conditional Trust	(1c) Yes	(2a) No	(2b) Conditional Trust	(2c) Yes	(3a) No	(3b) Conditional Trust	(3c) Yes	(4a) No	(4b) Conditional Trust	(4c) Yes
Exposed to Conflict	-.017	.076***	-.058**	-.016	.073***	-.057**	-.014	.074***	-.060**	-.018	.072***	-.054**
	(.016)	(.028)	(.028)	(.016)	(.027)	(.028)	(.016)	(.027)	(.027)	(.016)	(.027)	(.027)
p-value (yes = no)		{.249}			{.252}			{.192}			{.306}	
Age		✓			✓			✓			✓	
Other individual controls		✓			✓			✓			✓	
Village controls		✓			✓			✓			✓	
District of birth, district of residence FE		✓			✓			✓			✓	
Key infrastructure					✓			✓			✓	
Infrastructure Distance								✓			✓	
Service access											✓	
Service distance											✓	
National/District capital distance											✓	
Sample Average | Not exposed to conflict	.118	.504	.378	.118	.504	.378	.118	.504	.378	.118	.504	.378
Observations		3,891			3,891			3,891			3,891	

Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Average marginal effects for a multinomial logit specification are reported. All specifications include a cubic polynomial in age, district of birth and district of residence fixed effects. *Other individual controls* include dummy variables for respondents belonging to each of the three largest tribes in our sample (Mende, Temne and Limba); respondents identifying as Muslim; respondents' father has completed junior secondary education; respondent belongs to a ruling family. We also include dummies for respondents who do not know their father's education or family status. Village controls include the number of households residing in the community and the average PPI score, the latter being an index capturing household wealth. Standard errors are clustered by village of residence. Columns 1a-1c report our key results from table T2 for comparison. The subsequent sets of columns incrementally control for the presence of key infrastructures (market structure, primary school, secondary school, health centre, public toilet, communal area, drying floor), distance form key infrastructure (market structure, primary school, secondary school, health centre), access to and distance from a range of services (telecentre, vocational training centre, commercial bank, mobile money agent), and finally distances from the national and district capitals.

Table A12: Varying Definition of Exposure to Conflict and Trust

Multinomial logit, average marginal effects reported
Dependent variable: In general do you think people can be trusted?
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by village of residence

	Within 50km			Within 100km		
	(1a) No	(1b) Conditional Trust	(1c) Yes	(2a) No	(2b) Conditional Trust	(2c) Yes
Exposed to Conflict (Distance Weighted)	-.001	.026*	-.025*	-.002	.021	-.023
	(.010)	(.016)	(.015)	(.013)	(.021)	(.019)
Age	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Individual controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Village controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
District of birth and district of residence FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations		3,171			3,625	

Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Average marginal effects for a multinomial logit specification are reported. The distance weighted exposure to conflict measure is the sum of the number of episodes of violence experienced within the stated threshold, weighted by the inverse of the distance between the Chiefdom's centroid and the location where fighting took place. The logarithm of these measures is then standardized. The estimation sample thus only exploits variation along the intensive margin of conflict and includes only those respondents with some exposure to conflict according to the given measure. The average Chiefdom size corresponds to a threshold of 22km. Individual controls include a cubic polynomial in age, and dummy variables for: respondents belonging to each of the three largest tribes in our sample (Mende, Temne and Limba); respondents identifying as Muslim; respondents' father has completed junior secondary education; respondent belongs to a ruling family. Village controls include the number of households residing in the community and the average PPI score, the latter being an index capturing household wealth. We control for district of birth and district of residence fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by village of residence.

Table A13: Indecisiveness, Social Networks

Outcomes Columns 1-2: Neutral Answers, life satisfaction module
Outcomes Columns 3-6: Network degree by network type
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by village of residence

	Indecisiveness		Network Degree			
	(1) Neutral Answer, Any	(2) Neutral Answers, Share	(3) Friends	(4) Intimate Topics	(5) Work	(6) Credit
Exposed to Conflict	-.039	-.001	.021	.042	.026	.081
	(.029)	(008)	(.071)	(.045)	(.061)	(.074)
Sample Avg | Not exposed to conflict	.603	.111	2.00	.855	.830	.867
Individual controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Village Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
District of birth, district of residence FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	3,891	3,891	2,627			

Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. OLS estimates are reported throughout. The dependent variables in Columns 1 and 2 are derived from a set of questions measuring respondents' satisfaction along a number of dimensions. The questions are phrased as follows: "How do you feel about [category]?". The available categories are: own education, family, friends, job, income, own dwelling, own school, own community, future prospects, family's financial situation, access to credit, and life as a whole. Available answers belong to a 7-points Likert scale, ranging from very happy/optimistic to very sad/pessimistic. The middle of the scale is labelled as "neutral". Columns 3 to 6 report Tobit estimates of the impact of conflict exposure on respondents' network degree. This was measured at endline, in 2016, for a random subset of respondents who were asked to list the people they consider friends, they speak about intimate topics with, they can discuss work issues and opportunities with, or they can discuss issues related to finances and credit. Individual controls include a cubic polynomial in age, and dummy variables for: respondents belonging to each of the three largest tribes in our sample (Mende, Temne and Limba); respondents identifying as Muslim; respondents' father has completed junior secondary education; respondent belongs to a ruling family. Additionally, we include dummy variables indicating whether respondents do not remember their father's education or family status. Village controls include the number of households residing in the community and the average PPI score, the latter being an index capturing household wealth. We control for district of birth and district of residence fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by village of residence.

Table A14: Sources of Variation in Exposure to Conflict

Linear Probability Model

Dependent variable: In general do you think people can be trusted? (=1 if it depends)

Standard errors clustered by village of residence

	Age 14-25	Geography of Birth	Migration	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Exposed to Conflict	.073**	.079**	.084***	.101***
	(.029)	(.033)	(.030)	(.039)
Exposed to Conflict x Born into district bordering Liberia		-.012		
		(.044)		
Exposed to Conflict x Migrated during civil war			-.078	
			(.065)	
Exposed to Conflict x Migrated after civil war				-.037
				(.036)
Individual controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Village controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
District of birth, district of residence fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample Avg | Not exposed to conflict	.528	.504	.504	.504
Observations	3,277	3,891	3,891	3,891

Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Average marginal effects for a multinomial logit specification are reported. The sample in Column 1 drops because it does not include respondents age 13, i.e. those born the year the conflict ended. Individual controls include a cubic polynomial in age, and dummy variables for: respondents belonging to each of the three largest tribes in our sample (Mende, Temne and Limba); respondents identifying as Muslim; respondents' father has completed junior secondary education; respondent belongs to a ruling family. Additionally, we include dummy variables indicating whether respondents do not remember their father's education or family status. Village controls include the number of households residing in the community and the average PPI score, the latter being an index capturing household wealth. We control for district of birth and district of residence fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by village of residence.

Table A15: Placebo and IV Specifications

Multinomial logit, average marginal effects reported
Dependent variable: In general do you think people can be trusted?
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by village of residence

	Placebo: Year of Birth + 5			IV	IV
	(1a) No	(1b) Conditional Trust	(1c) Yes	(2) Conditional Trust	(3) Conditional Trust
Exposed to Conflict	-.011	.003	.008	.128**	.139**
	(.021)	(.036)	(.032)	(.064)	(.064)
p-value (yes = no)		{.649}			
Individual controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Village controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
District of birth and district of residence FE	✓	✓	✓		
IV: Distance from first episode at birth				✓	✓
IV: Distance from Freetown at birth					✓
IV: F-Stat / {p-value}				32.9 / {.000}	38.7 / {.000}
Sample Average | Not exposed to conflict	.105	.585	.311	.492	.492
Observations		2,044		3,891	3,891

Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. In Columns 1a-1c, average marginal effects for a multinomial logit specification are reported. In Columns 2 and 3, 2SLS estimates are reported. In Columns 1a-1c we report a placebo test whereby year of birth and the date of each migration spell is increased by five years before matching this information with UCDP data to construct a placebo exposure to conflict measure. We restrict the estimation sample to those respondents who would still have been born no later than 2001 according to this placebo year of birth (19 or older at the time of the survey in 2014). For the 2SLS estimates we use two sets of instruments for exposure to conflict: a set of dummy variables for each year of the conflict and equal to 1 from respondents' year of birth onwards, interacted with either distance between place of birth and location of first episode of violence in 1991, or distance between place of birth and Freetown. The estimation sample excludes 48 respondents that were either born abroad and moved to Sierra Leone during childhood, or for which the Chiefdom of birth could not be identified. All specifications include a cubic polynomial in age, and district of residence fixed effects. Controls include dummy variables for: respondents belonging to each of the three largest tribes in our sample (Mende, Temne and Limba); respondents identifying as Muslim; respondents' father has completed junior secondary education; respondent belongs to a ruling family. Additionally, we include dummy variables indicating whether respondents do not remember their father's education or family status. Village controls include the number of households residing in the community and the average PPI score, the latter being an index capturing household wealth. Standard errors are clustered at the community level.

Table A16: Measurement Error in Experiences of Conflict

OLS regression estimates
Dependent variable: index of self-efficacy
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by village of residence

	(1) Baseline	(2) Victimized only	(3) Personally harmed into direct experience	(4) Personally harmed and fighting in the area into direct experience	(5) Reclassify all socialized as direct experience
Parental protection/trauma	.194***	-	.190***	.151	.192***
	(.062)		(.063)	(.101)	(.069)
Direct	.164***	.142**	.143***	.022	.057
	(.058)	(.063)	(.058)	(.107)	(.061)
Background narrative	.090	-	.090	.073	.113
	(.066)		(.068)	(.102)	(.079)
Trauma	.049	-	.039	-.035	omitted
	(.066)		(.065)	(.108)	
Socialized	omitted	omitted	omitted	omitted	
Sample Average | Omitted group	0	0	0	0	0
p-values:					
Parental protection/trauma = Direct	{.683}		{.518}	{.048}	{.032}
Parental protection/trauma = Background narrative	{.121}		{.133}	{.238}	{.244}
Parental protection/trauma = Trauma	{.035}		{.027}	{.007}	{.006}
Direct = Background narrative	{.396}		{.521}	{.485}	{.421}
Direct = Trauma	{.084}		{.115}	{.347}	
Background narrative = Trauma	{.614}		{.518}	{.169}	
Individual controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Village controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
District of birth, district of residence FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R-squared	.067				
Observations	3,891	1,689	3,891	3,891	3,891

Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. OLS estimates are reported. The outcome in all columns is our chosen measure of self-efficacy, an inverse covariance weighted index using the approach set out by Anderson [2008]. This aggregates 21 components across five domains: self-control (3 components); drive, grit and leadership (4 components); enforcement and persuasion (4 components); entrepreneurial skills (6 components) and future planning (4 components). The index is standardized with respect to the omitted group in each regression. Individual controls include a cubic polynomial in age, and dummy variables for: respondents belonging to each of the three largest tribes in our sample (Mende, Temne and Limba); respondents identifying as Muslim; respondents' father has completed junior secondary education; respondent belongs to a ruling family. We also include dummies for respondents who do not know their father's education or family status. Village controls include the number of households residing in the community and the average PPI score, the latter being an index capturing household wealth. We control for district of birth and district of residence fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by village of residence.

Table A17: Exposure to Conflict, Anxiety and Life Satisfaction

Dependent variable Columns 1-4: Ever worry about…?

Dependent variable Columns 5-7: Life satisfaction indices

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by village of residence

	Anxiety				Satisfaction		
	(1) Job	(2) Finding Husband	(3) Money	(4) Violence/ Theft	(5) Social	(6) Economic	(7) Life
Exposed to Conflict	.035	.014	.031	.059**	.098*	.086	.134**
	(.023)	(.023)	(.022)	(.025)	(.054)	(.057)	(.062)
Individual controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Village controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
District of birth, district of residence FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample Average | Not exposed to conflict	.566	.481	.753	.459	0	0	0
Observations	3,891	3,891	3,891	3,891	3,891	3,891	3,891

Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. OLS estimates are reported. In Columns 1 to 4, the outcome variables are dummies indicating whether the respondent ever worries about a specific topic or issue. In Columns 5 to 7 the outcome variables are indices of satisfaction computed over three spheres: social, economic, and life in general. Each satisfaction outcome is an inverse covariance weighted index using the approach set out by Anderson [2008], constructed from questions asking respondents to rate their satisfaction on a Likert scale. The dimensions over which these questions are asked are: (i) Social: friends, family, community, house; (ii) Economic: own education, job, earnings, household finances, access to credit; (ii) Life: life as a whole, future prospects. The indices are standardized relative to the omitted group (those not exposed to conflict). Individual controls include a cubic polynomial in age, and dummy variables for: respondents belonging to each of the three largest tribes in our sample (Mende, Temne and Limba); respondents identifying as Muslim; respondents' father has completed junior secondary education; respondent belongs to a ruling family. Additionally, we include dummy variables indicating whether respondents do not remember their father's education or family status. Village controls include the number of households residing in the community and the average PPI score, the latter being an index capturing household wealth. We control for district of birth and district of residence fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by village of residence.

Figure A1: Cumulative Fighting Intensity, by Chiefdom



Notes: The data are drawn from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). The maps portray the cumulative number of episodes of conflict, at the Chiefdom level, at the end of four key years of the Sierra Leonean civil war. An episode of conflict is defined as the use of armed forced by an organized actor against another, or against civilians, that resulted in at least one death. The conflict started in 1991 when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) began taking control of the country, with limited opposition from the Sierra Leonean Army (SLA). In 1993 a government offensive supported by ECOMOG pushed the RUF back towards the Liberian border. Notwithstanding this effort, RUF regained territories, approaching the capital Freetown in 1995. In 1997, dissidents within the SLA formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary council (AFRC) and staged a successful coup with RUF's blessing, leading to rebels conquering the capital. A UN peace keeping mission was deployed in 1999 and, joined by British forces in 2000, they quickly regained control of country. The last episode of conflict was recorded in 2001, and the war was declared to be over in January 2002.

Figure A2: Time Series Variation in Conflict

Panel A. Fighting by year and Chiefdom



Panel B. Sample year of birth



Notes: Panel A reports, for each year, which Chiefdoms experienced any episode of fighting. The data are drawn from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). An episode of conflict is defined as the use of armed forced by an organized actor against another, or against civilians, that resulted in at least one death. Region 1 corresponds to districts of Pujehun, Kenema and Kailahun. Region 2 corresponds to districts Bonthe, Moyamba, Bo, Tonkolili, Kono and Koinadugu. Region 3 corresponds to districts Western Urban, Western Rural, Port Loko, Kambia and Bombali. Panel B reports the year of birth of respondents in our sample using our baseline survey.

Figure A3: Sample Construction



Figure A4: Migration Histories

A. Respondents' Chiefdom of Birth



B. Respondents' Chiefdom of Residence, 2016



C. Past Conflict Intensity, Origin Minus Destination



D. Future Conflict Intensity, Post migration



Notes: Panel A shows the cumulative conflict intensity for all Chiefdoms where at least on respondent was born. Panel B shows the same data for the Chiefdoms where sampled respondents currently live. Cumulative conflict intensity is defined as the total number of violent episodes that took place in a Chiefdom between 1991 and 2001. Panels C and D shows data for 919 migration spells that took place during the civil war between 1991 and 2000. For each spell, we compute: (i) the difference in the total number of episodes of violence between the Chiefdom of origin and the Chiefdom of destination; (ii) then difference in the total number of episodes of violence taking place in the two Chiefdoms after the migration took place.

Figure A5: Comparative Statics on k and Trust



Figure A6: IV, First Stage Estimates



Notes: Each Panel shows the first stage coefficient estimates from the IV models reported. For convenience, we report only the coefficients on the instruments, with 90% confidence intervals. These instruments are the interactions of a vector of dummy variables, one for each year between 1991-2000 and equal to one from the respondent year of birth onward, with two distance measures. In the left Panel, the distance interacted with is between place of birth and the first episode of violence recorded in UCDP data, which took place in Pujehun district, close to the Liberian border, in 1991. In the right hand Panel, we use the previous measure as well as an interaction with the distance between the respondent's place of birth and Freetown, Sierra Leone's capital.